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Abstract
This paper studies assortment and pricing optimization problems under the Two-Stage Luce
model (2SLM), a discrete choice model introduced by Echenique and Saito (2018) that gener-
alizes the multinomial logit model (MNL). The model employs an utility function as in the the
MNL, and a dominance relation between products. When consumers are offered an assortment
S, they first discard all dominated products in S and then select one of the remaining products
using the standard MNL. This model may violate the regularity condition, which states that
the probability of choosing a product cannot increase if the offer set is enlarged. Therefore, the
2SLM falls outside the large family of discrete choice models based on random utility which con-
tains almost all choice models studied in revenue management. We prove that the assortment
problem under the 2SLM is polynomial-time solvable. Moreover, we show that the capacitated
assortment optimization problem is NP-hard and but it admits polynomial-time algorithms for
the relevant special cases cases where (1) the dominance relation is attractiveness-correlated
and (2) its transitive reduction is a forest. The proofs exploit a strong connection between
assortments under the 2SLM and independent sets in comparability graphs. Finally, we study
the associated joint pricing and assortment problem under this model. First, we show that well
known optimal pricing policy for the MNL can be arbitrarily bad. Our main result in this sec-
tion is the development of an efficient algorithm for this pricing problem. The resulting optimal
pricing strategy is simple to describe: it assigns the same price for all products, except for the
one with the highest attractiveness and as well as for the one with the lowest attractiveness.
1 Introduction
Revenue Management (RM) is the managerial practice of modifying the availability and the prices
of products in order to maximise revenue or profit. The origin of this discipline dates back to
the 1970’s, following the deregulation of the US airline market. A large volume of research has
been devoted to this area over the last 45 years, with successful results in many industries ranging
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from airlines, hospitality, retailing, and others (McGill and van Ryzin, 1999; Ko¨k, Fisher, and
Vaidyanathan, 2005; Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Chaar, 2010).
Two main problems lay in the core of RM theory and practice: the optimal assortment problem,
and the pricing problem. The optimal assortment problem consists of selecting a subset of products
to offer customers in order to maximize revenue. Consider, for example, a retailer with limited space
allocated to mobile phones. If the store has more than 500 mobile phones that can be acquired
through its distributors (in various combinations of brands and sizes) and the mobile phone aisle
has capacity to fit 50 phones on the shelves, the store manager has to decide which subset of
products to offer given the product costs and the customer preferences.
In order to solve the assortment problem we need a model to predict how customers select
products when they are presented with a set of alternatives. Most models of discrete choice theory
postulate that consumers assign an utility to each alternative and given an offer set, they would
choose the alternative with maximum utility. Different assumptions on the distribution of the
utilities lead to different discrete choice models: Celebrated examples include the multinomial logit
(MNL) (Luce, 1959), the mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) (Daly and Zachary, 1978), and the
nested multinomial logit (NMNL) (Williams, 1977).
The multinomial logit model (MNL), also known as the Luce model, is widely used in discrete
choice theory. Since the model was introduced by Luce (1959), it was applied to a wide variety of
demand estimation problems arising in transportation (McFadden, 1978; Catalano, Lo Casto, and
Migliore, 2008), marketing (Guadagni and Little, 1983; Gensch, 1985; Rusmevichientong, Shen, and
Shmoys, 2010), and revenue management (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004; Rusmevichientong, Shen,
and Shmoys, 2010). One of the reasons for its success stems from its small number of parameters
(one for each product): This allows for simple estimation procedures that generally avoids over
fitting problems even when there is limited historical data (McFadden, 1974). However, one of the
flaws of the MNL is the property known as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives(IIA), which
states that the ratio between the probabilities of choosing elements x and y is constant regardless
of the offered subset. This property does not hold when products cannibalize each other or are
perfect substitutes (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Debreu, 1960; Anderson, Depalma, and Thisse,
1992).
Several extensions to the MNL model have been introduced to overcome the IIA property and
some of its other weaknesses; They include the nested multinomial logit and the latent class MNL
model. These models however do not handle zero-probability choices well. Consider two products
a and b: The MNL model states that the probability of selecting a over b depends on the relative
attractiveness of a compared to the attractiveness of b. Consider the case in which b is never
selected when a is offered. Under the MNL model, this means that b must have zero attractiveness.
But this would prevent b from being selected even when a is not offered in an assortment.
On the other hand, the pricing problem amounts to determine the prices that a company should
offer, in order to best meet its objectives (profit maximization, revenue maximization, market share
maximization, etc.), while taking into consideration how customers will respond to different prices
2
and the interaction between price and the intrinsic features that each product possess.
This paper considers both problems mentioned before, for the case when customers follow the
Two-Stage Luce model (2SLM). The 2SLM was recently introduced by Echenique and Saito (2018)
and unlike the MNL, it allows for violations to the IIA property and regularity (Berbeglia and
Joret, 2017). The Two-Stage Luce model generalizes the MNL by incorporating a dominance (anti-
symmetric and transitive) relation among the alternatives. Under such relationship, the presence
of an alternative x may prevent another alternative y from being chosen despite the fact that both
are present in the offered assortment. In this case, alternative x is said to dominate alternative y.
However, when x is not present, y might be chosen with positive probability if it is not dominated
by any other product z.
An important application of the 2SLM can be found in assortment problems where there exists
a direct way to compare the products over a set of features. For illustration, consider a telecommu-
nication company offering phone plans to consumers. A plan is characterized by a set of features
such as price per month, free minutes in peak hours, free minutes in weekends, free data, price for
additional data, and price per minute to foreign countries. Given two plans x and y, we say that
plan x dominates plan y, if the price per month of x is less than that of y, and x is at least as good
as y in every single feature. In the past, the company offered consumers a certain set of plans St
each month t such that no plan in St is dominated by another plan (in St). The offered plans how-
ever were different each month. Using historical data and assuming that consumers preferences can
be approximated using a multinomial logit, it is possible to perform a robust estimation procedure
to obtain the parameters of such MNL model. Once the parameters are obtained, the assortment
problem consists in finding the best assortment of phones plans S∗ to maximize the expected rev-
enue. A natural constraint in this problem consisting in enforcing that every phone plan offered
in S∗ cannot be dominated by any other. Section 4 shows that the problem discussed here can
be modelled using the 2SLM and thus solving this problem is reduced to solving an assortment
problem under the 2SLM.
2 Contributions
The first key contribution is to show that the assortment problem can be solved in polynomial time
under the 2SLM. The proof is built upon two unrelated results in optimization: the polynomial-
time solvability of the maximum-independent set in a comparability graph (Mo¨hring, 1985) and
a seminal result by Megiddo (1979) that provides an algorithm to solve a class of combinatorial
optimization problems with rational objective functions in polynomial time. This is particularly
appealing since the 2SLM is one of the very few choice models that goes beyond the random utility
model and it allows violations the property known as regularity : the probability of choosing an
alternative cannot increase if the offer set is enlarged. Since many decades ago, there are well-
documented lab experiments where the regularity property is violated (Huber, Payne, and Puto,
1982; Tversky and Simonson, 1993; Herne, 1997).
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The second key contribution is to show that the capacitated assortment problem under the 2SLM
is NP-hard, which contrasts with results on the MNL. We then propose polynomial algorithms for
two interesting subcases of the capacitated assortment problem: (1) When the dominance relation
is attractiveness-correlated and (2) when the transitive reduction of the dominance relation can be
represented as a forest. The proofs use a strong connection between assortments under the 2SLM
and independent sets.
The third and final contribution, is an in-depth study of the pricing problem under the 2SLM.
We first note that changes in prices should be reflected in the dominance relation if the differences
between the resulting attractiveness are large enough. This is formalized by solving the Joint
Assortment and Pricing problem under the Threshold Luce model, where one product dominates
another if the ratio between their attractiveness is bigger than a fixed threshold. Under this
setting, we show that this problem can be solved in polynomial time. The proof relies on the
following interesting facts: (1) An intrinsic utility ordered assortment is optimal; (2) the optimal
prices can be obtained in polynomial time; and (3) it assigns the same price for all products, except
for two of them, the highest and lowest attractiveness ones. Many of these results are extended to
the following cases (1) capacity constrained problems, where the number of products that can be
offered is restricted and (2) position bias, where products are assigned to positions, altering their
perceived attractiveness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 presents a review of the literature con-
cerning assortment optimization and pricing under variations of the Multinomial Logit. Section 4
formalizes the 2SLM and some of its properties. Section 5 proves that assortment optimization
under the 2SLM is polynomial-time solvable. Section 6 presents the results on the capacitated
version, particularly the NP-hardness of the capacitated version of the problem, but also provide
polynomial time solutions for two special cases. Section 7 present the results for pricing optimisa-
tion under the Threshold Luce model. Section 8 concludes the paper and provides future research
directions. All proofs missing from the main text, are provided in Appendix A.
3 Literature Review
Since the assortment problem and the joint assortment and pricing problem are a very active
research topic, we focus on recent results closely related with this paper and in particular, results
over the multinomial logit model (MNL) (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1978) and its variants.
Despite the IIA property, the MNL is widely used. Indeed, for many applications, the mean
utility of a product can be modeled as a linear combination of its features. If the features capture
the mean utility associated with each product, then the error between the utilities and their means
may be considered as independent noise and the MNL emerges as a natural candidate for modeling
customer choice. In addition, the MNL parameters can be estimated from customer choice data,
even with limited data (Ford, 1957; Negahban, Oh, and Shah, 2012), because the associated estima-
tion problem has a concave log likelihood function (McFadden, 1974) and it is possible to measure
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how good the fitted MNL approximates the data (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). Moreover, it is
possible to improve model estimation when the IIA property is likely to be satisfied (Train, 2003).
One of the first positive results on the assortment problem under the multinomial logit model was
obtained by Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004), where the authors showed that the optimal assortment
can be found by greedily by adding products to the offered assortment in the order of decreasing
revenues, thus evaluating at most a linear number of subsets. Rusmevichientong, Shen, and Shmoys
(2010) studied the assortment problem under the MNL but with a capacity constraint limiting the
products that can be offered. Under these conditions, the optimal solution is not necessarily a
revenue-ordered assortment but it can still be found in polynomial time.
Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov (2011) proposed a more general attraction model where the
probabilities of choosing a product depend on all the products (not only the offered subset as in
the MNL). This involves a shadow attraction value associated with each product that influence the
choice probabilities when the product is not offered. Davis, Gallego, and Topaloglu (2013) showed
that a slight transformation of the MNL model allows for the solving of the assortment problem
when the choice probabilities follow this more sophisticated attraction model. This continues to
hold when assortments must satisfy a set of totally unimodular constraints.
The Mixed Multinomial Logit (Daly and Zachary, 1978) is an extension of the MNL model,
where different sets of customers follow different MNL models. Under this setting, the problem
becomes NP-hard (Bront, Me´ndez-Dı´az, and Vulcano, 2009) and it remains NP-hard even for two
customer types (Rusmevichientong et al., 2014). A branch-and-cut algorithm was proposed by
Me´ndez-Dı´az et al. (2014). Feldman and Topaloglu (2015) proposed methods to obtain good upper
bounds on the optimal revenue. Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (2012) considered a model where
customers follow a MNL model and the parameters belong to a compact uncertainty set. The firm
wants to hedge against the worst-case scenario and the problem amounts to finding an optimal
assortment under this uncertainty conditions. Surprisingly, when there is no capacity constraint,
the revenue-ordered strategy is optimal in this setting. Jagabathula (2014) proposed a local-search
heuristic for the assortment problem under an arbitrary discrete choice model. Davis, Gallego,
and Topaloglu (2013) and Abeliuk et al. (2016) proposed polynomial time algorithms to solve
the assortment problem under the MNL model with capacity constraint and position bias, where
position bias means that customer choices are affected by the positioning of the products in the
assortment. Recently, Jagabathula and Vulcano (2015) proposed a partial-order model to estimate
individual preferences, where preference over products are modeled using forests. They cluster the
customers in classes, each class being represented with a forest. When facing an assortment S,
customers select, following an MNL model, products that are roots of the forest projected on S.
This approach outperformed state-of-the-art methods when measuring the accuracy of individual
predictions.
Attention has also been devoted to discrete choice models to represent customer choices in
more realistic ways, including models that violate the IIA property (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985).
This property does not always hold in practice (Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers, 2006), includ-
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ing when products cannibalize each other (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Echenique, Saito, and
Tserenjigmid (2018) identify these violations as perception priorities, and adjust probabilities to
take their effects into account. Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014) provide an axiomatic gen-
eralization of MNL model to address the case where the products share features. Fudenberg and
Strzalecki (2015) propose an axiomatic generalization of a discounted logit model incorporating a
parameter to model the influence of the assortment size.
Customers tend to use rules to simplify decisions, and before making a purchase decision, they
often narrow down the set of alternatives to chose from, using different heuristics to make the
decision process simpler. Several models of consider-then-choose models have been proposed in
the literature, related with attention filters, search costs, feature filters, among others, another
reasonable way to discard options, is when the difference between attractiveness is so evident, that
the less attractive alternative, even when it is offered, is never picked (as in the Threshold Luce
model, Echenique and Saito (2018)). Any of the heuristics mentioned before allows the consumer
to restrict her attention to a smaller set usually referred in the literature as consideration set. This
effect also provokes that offered product might result having zero-probability choices.
Several models have been proposed to address the issue of zero-probability choices. Masatlioglu,
Nakajima, and Ozbay (2012) propose a theoretical foundation for maximizing a single preference
under limited attention, i.e., when customers select among the alternatives that they pay attention
to. Manzini and Mariotti (2014) incorporate the role of attention into stochastic choice, proposing a
model in which customers consider each offered alternative with a probability and choose the alter-
native maximizing a preference relation within the considered alternatives. This was axiomatized
and generalized in Brady and Rehbeck (2016), by introducing the concept of random conditional
choice set rule, which captures correlations in the availability of alternatives. This concept also
provided a natural way to model substitutability and complementarity.
Payne (1976) showed that a considerable portion of the subjects in his experimental setting
use a decision process involving a consideration set. Numerous studies in marketing also validated
a consider-then-choose decision process. In his seminal work Hauser (1978) observed that most
of the heterogeneity in consumer choice can be explained by consideration sets. He shows that
nearly 80% of the heterogeneity in choice is captured by a richer model based in the combination of
consideration sets and logit-based rankings. The rationale behind this observation is that first stage
filters eliminate a large fraction of alternatives, thus the resulting consideration sets are composed
of a few products in most of the studied categories (Belonax Jr and Mittelstaedt, 1978; Hauser and
Wernerfelt, 1990). Pras and Summers (1975) and Gilbride and Allenby (2004) empirically showed
that consumers form their consideration sets by a conjunction of elimination rules. Furthermore,
there are empirical results showing that a Two-Stage model including consideration sets better
fits consumer search patterns than sequential models (De los Santos, Hortac¸su, and Wildenbeest,
2012).
Form a customer standpoint, the use for consider-then-choose models alleviate the cognitive
burden of deciding when facing too many alternatives Tversky (1972a,b); Tversky and Kahneman
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(1974); Payne, Bettman, and Luce (1996). When dealing with a decision under limited time and
knowledge, customers often recur to screening heuristics as show in Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996).
Psychologically speaking, customers as decision makers need to carefully balance search efforts and
opportunity costs with potential gains, and consideration sets help to achieve that goal (Roberts and
Lattin, 1991; Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990; Payne, Bettman, and Luce, 1996). Recently Jagabathula
and Rusmevichientong (2017) proposed a Two-Stage model where customers consider only the
products are contained within certain range of their willingness to pay. Aouad, Farias, and Levi
(2015) explored consider-then-choose models where each costumer has a consideration set, and a
ranking of the products within it. The customer then selects the higher ranked product offered.
The authors studied the assortment problem under several consideration sets and ranking structure,
and provide a dynamic programming approach capable of returning the optimal assortment in
polynomial time for families of consideration set functions originated by screening rules Hauser,
Ding, and Gaskin (2009). Dai et al. (2014) considered a revenue management model where an
upcoming customer might discard one offered itinerary alternative due to individual restrictions,
such as time of departure. Wang and Sahin (2018) studied a choice model that incorporates product
search costs, so the set that a customer considers might differ from what is being offered.
Multi-product price optimisation under the MNL and the NL has been studied since the models
were introduced in the literature. One of the first results on the structure of the problem is due
to Hanson and Martin (1996), where they show that the profit function for a company selling
substitutable products when customers follow the MNL model is not jointly concave in price. To
overcome this issue, in Song and Xue (2007) and later in Dong, Kouvelis, and Tian (2009), the
authors show that even when the profit function is not concave in prices, it is concave in the market
share and there is a one-to-one correspondence between price and market share. Multiple studies
shown that under the MNL where all products share the same price sensitivity parameter, the
mark-up which is simply the difference between price and cost, remains constant for all products
at optimality (Anderson, Depalma, and Thisse, 1992; Hopp and Xu, 2005; Gallego and Stefanescu,
2009; Besbes and Saure´, 2016). Furthermore, the profit function is also uni-modal on this constant
quantity and it has a unique optimal solution, which can be determined by studying the first order
conditions.
Li and Huh (2011) showed the same result for the NL model. Up to that point, all previous
results assumed an identical price sensitivity parameter for all products. Under the MNL, there
is empirical evidence that shows the importance of allowing different price sensitivity parameters
for each product (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Erdem, Swait, and Louviere, 2002). There
is is also evidence in Bo¨rsch-Supan (1990) that restricting the nest specific parameters to the unit
interval results in rejection of the NL model when fitting the data, thus recommending to relax
this assumption. The problem when relaxing this condition, is that the profit function is no longer
concave on the market share, which complicates the optimization task. In Gallego and Wang
(2014) the authors considered a NL model with differentiated price sensitivities, and found that
the adjusted mark-up, defined as price minus cost minus the reciprocal of the price sensitivity is
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constant for all products within a nest at optimality. Furthermore, each nest also has an adjusted
next-level markup which is also invariant across nests, which reduces the original problem to a
one variable optimization problem. Additional theoretical development can be found in Rayfield,
Rusmevichientong, and Topaloglu (2015); Kouvelis, Xiao, and Yang (2015) but there are restricted
to the Two-Stage nested logit model. In Huh and Li (2015) some of the results were extended to a
multi-stage nested logit model for specific settings, but also show that the equal mark-up property
fails to hold in general for products that do not share the same immediate parent node in the
nested choice structure, even when considering identical price sensitivity parameters. Li and Huh
(2011) and Gallego and Wang (2014) extend to the multi-stage NL model and show that an optimal
pricing solution can still be found by means of maximizing a scalar function.
There are some interesting results for other models that share similarities with the MNL, and
therefore are closely related with the model that we are studying. In Wang and Sahin (2018), the
authors incorporate search cost into consumer choice model. The results on this paper for the Joint
Assortment and Pricing are similar to the ones that we study in Section 7, in that many structural
results that holds at optimality for their model, are also satisfied in our studied case. They show
that the quasi-same price policy (that charges the same price for all products but one, the least
attractive one) was optimal for this model. Interestingly, the Joint Assortment and Pricing results
under the Threshold Luce Model has a slightly different result: The optimal pricing is a fixed price
for all products, except for the most attractive and least attractive ones. This led to a situation
where there are many possible prices, not just two.
Recently Alptekinog˘lu and Semple (2016) hast studied in depth a model which was originally
due to Daganzo (1979) that assumes a negatively skewed distribution of consumer utilities. The
resulting choice probabilities have an interesting consequence in the optimal pricing policy: They
allow for variable mark-ups in optimal prices that increase with expected utilities.
The model considered in this paper is a variant of the MNL, proposed by Echenique and Saito
(2018) and called the Two-Stage Luce model ; It handles zero-probability choice by introducing the
concept of dominance, meaning that if a product x dominates a product y, then y is never selected
in presence of y. And therefore the consideration set is formed by considering only non-dominated
products in the offered assortment, allowing flexibility on the consideration set formation due to
the nature of the dominance relation. Once the consideration set is formed, the customer choose
according to an MNL on the remaining alternatives. In the following section we describe this model
in detail, and show some examples that highlight many practical applications for it.
4 The Two-Stage Luce model
The 2SLM (Echenique and Saito, 2018) overcomes a key limitation of the MNL: The fact that
a product must have zero attractiveness if it has zero probability to be chosen in a particular
assortment. This limitation means that the product cannot be chosen with positive probability
in any other assortment. The 2SLM eliminates this pathological situation through the concept of
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consideration function which, given a set of products S, returns a subset of S where each product
has a positive probability of being selected. Let X denotes the set of all products and let a(x) > 0
be the attractiveness of product x ∈ X. For notational convenience, we use ax to denote the
attractiveness of product x, i.e., ax = a(x). We extend the attractiveness function to consider the
outside option, with index 0 and a0 = a(0) ≥ 0, to model the fact that customers may not select
any product. As a result, the attractiveness function has signature a : X ∪ {0} → R+. Given an
assortment A ⊆ X, a stochastic choice function ρ returns a probability distribution over A, i.e.,
ρ(x,A) is the probability of picking x in the assortment A. The 2SLM is a sub case of the general
Luce model presented in Echenique and Saito (2018), and independently discovered in Ahumada
and U¨lku¨ (2018), which is defined below.
Definition 1 (General Luce Function ∗, Echenique and Saito (2018)). A stochastic choice function
ρ is called a general Luce function if there exists an attractiveness function a ∪ {0} : X → R+ and
a function c : 2X \ ∅ → 2X \ ∅ with c(A) ⊆ A for all A ⊆ X such that
ρ(x,A) =

ax∑
y∈c(A) ay+a0
if x ∈ c(A),
0 if x /∈ A.
(1)
for all A ⊆ X. We call the pair (a, c) a general Luce model.
The function c (which is arbitrary) provides a way to capture the support of the stochastic choice
function ρ. As observed in Echenique and Saito (2018), there are two interesting cases worthy of
being mentioned:
1. If c(S) is a singleton for all S ⊆ X, then ρ(x, S) is a deterministic choice.
2. If c(S) = S for all S ⊆ X, then the 2SLM coincides with the MNL.
Two special cases of this model were provided in Echenique and Saito (2018). The first is
the two-stage Luce model. This model restricts c, such that the c(A) represents the set of all
undominated alternatives in A.
Definition 2 (two-Stage Luce model (2SLM), Echenique and Saito (2018)). A general Luce model
(a, c) is called a 2SLM if there exists a strict partial order (i.e. transitive, antisymmetric and
irreflexive binary relation)  such that:
c(A) = {x ∈ A | 6 ∃y ∈ A : y  x} . (2)
We call  dominance relation.
As a result, any 2SLM can be described by an irreflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation 
that fully captures the relation between products. The second model presented in Echenique and
Saito (2018), which is a particular case of the 2SLM, is the Threshold Luce Model (TLM), where
∗The definition is slightly different: It makes the outside option effect a0 explicit in the denominator.
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they explain dominance in terms of how big the attractiveness are when compared with each other,
so c is strongly tied to a. More specifically, for a given threshold t > 0, the consideration set c(S)
for a set S ⊆ X is defined as:
c(S) = {y ∈ S | 6 ∃x ∈ S : ax > (1 + t)ay}. (3)
In other words, x  y if and only if axay > (1 + t). Intuitively, an attractiveness ratio of more than
(1 + t) means that the less-preferred alternative is dominated by the more-preferred alternative.
Observe that the relation  is clearly irreflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.
The dominance relation  can thus be represented as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), where
nodes represent the products and there is a directed edge (x, y) if and only if x  y. Sets satisfying
c(S) = S are anti-chains in the DAG, meaning that there are no arcs connecting them. For
instance, consider the Threshold Luce model defined over X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with attractiveness
values a1 = 12, a2 = 8, a3 = 6, a4 = 3 and a5 = 2, and threshold t = 0.4. We have that i  j iff
ai > 1.4 aj .
The DAG representing this dominance relation is depicted in Figure 1.
1
a1 = 12
2
a2 = 8
3
a3 = 6
4
a4 = 3
5
a5 = 2
Figure 1: Example of a DAG for a General Threshold Luce model
In the following example, we show that the 2SLM admits regularity violations, meaning that it
is possible that the probability of choosing a product can increase when we enlarge the offered set.
Since regularity is satisfied by any choice model based on random utility (RUM), this shows that
the 2SLM is not contained in the RUM class †.
Example 1. Consider the following instance of the Threshold Luce model (which is a special case
of the 2SLM). Let X = {1, 2, 3, 4} with attractiveness a1 = 5, a2 = 4, a3 = 3 and a4 = 3. Consider
t = 0.4 and the attractiveness of the outside option a0 = 1. For the offer set {2, 3, 4}, the probability
of selecting product 2 is 4/11 since no product dominates each other. However, if we add product 1
to the offer set, i.e. if we offer all four products, then the probability of selecting product 2 increases
to 4/10, because products 3 and 4 are now dominated by product 1.
The Two-Stage Luce Model allows to accommodate different decision heuristics and market
scenarios by specifying the dominance relation responding to a specific set of rules. Two cases
where this can be observed are provided below.
†Observe that this implies that the 2SLM is not contained by the Markov chain model proposed by (Blanchet,
Gallego, and Goyal, 2016) since this last one belongs to the RUM class (Berbeglia, 2016).
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Feature Difference Threshold: Assume that each product has a set of features F = {1, . . . ,m}.
A product x can then be represented by a m-dimensional vector x ∈ Rm. Assume that the
perceived relevance of each feature k is measured by a weight νk, so that the utility perceived by
the customers can be expressed as a weighted combination of their features u(x) =
∑m
k=1 νk · xk.
The dominance relation can be defined as x  y ⇐⇒ u(x) − u(y) = ∑mk=1 νk(xk − yk) ≥ T ,
where T > 0 is a tolerance parameter that represents how much difference a customer allows before
considering that an alternative dominates another. The dominance relation is irreflexive, transitive,
and antisymmetric and hence it can be used to define an instance of the 2SLM. One can easily
show that this model is a special case of the TLM.
Price levels: Suppose we have N products, each product i has ki price levels. Let xil be product
i with price pil attached and it corresponding attractiveness ail, we assume that for each product
i prices pik satisfy pi1 < pi2 < . . . , piki . Naturally, xi1  xi2  . . .  xiki , because for the same
product the customer is going to select the one with the lowest price available. Each price level
for each product can still dominate or be dominated by other products as well, as long as the
dominance relation is irreflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. This setting can be modelled by
the Two-Stage Luce model in a natural way.
5 Assortment Problems Under the Two-Stage Luce model
This section studies the assortment problem for the 2SLM using the definitions and notations
presented earlier. Let r : X ∪ {0} → R+ be a revenue function associated with each product and
satisfying r(0) = 0. The expected revenue of a set S ⊆ X is given by
R(S) =
∑
i∈c(S)
ρ(i, S)r(i). (4)
The assortment problem amounts to finding a set
S∗ ∈ argmax
S⊆X
R(S)
yielding an optimal revenue of
R∗ = max
S⊆X
R(S).
Observe that every subset S ⊆ X can be uniquely represented by a binary vector x ∈ {0, 1}n such
that i ∈ S if and only if xi = 1. Using this bijection, the search space for S∗ can be restricted to
D = {x ∈ {0, 1}n | ∀s  t : xs + xt ≤ 1}
where D represents all the subsets satisfying S = c(S), which means that no product on S dominates
another product in S. There is always an optimal solution S∗ that belongs to D because R(S) =
R(c(S)) and c(S) ∈ D for all sets S in X. As a result, the Assortment Problem under the 2SLM
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(AP-2SLM) can be formulated as
maximize
x
∑n
i=1 riaixi∑n
i=1 aixi + a0
subject to x ∈ D
(AP-2SLM)
where ri and ai represent r(i) and a(i) for simplicity.
An effective strategy for solving many assortment problems consists in considering revenue-
ordered assortments, which are obtained by choosing a threshold ρ and selecting all the products
with revenue at least ρ. This strategy leads to an optimal algorithm for the assortment problem
under the MNL. Unfortunately, it fails under the 2SLM because adding a highly attractive product
may remove many dominated products whose revenues and utilities would lead to a higher revenue.
Example 2 (Sub-Optimality of Revenue-Ordered Assortments). Consider a Threshold Luce model
with X = {1, 2, 3}, revenues r1 = 88, r2 = 47, r3 = 46, attractiveness a0 = 55, a1 = 13, a2 = 26, a3 =
15 and t = 0.6. Then x  y iff ax > 1.6 ay which gives 2  1 and 2  3. Consider the sets S ⊆ X
satisfying S = c(S):
S R(S)
{1} 16.824
{2} 15.086
{3} 9.857
{1, 3} 22.096
The optimal revenue is given by assortment {1, 3}, while the best revenue-ordered assortment
under the 2SLM is S = {1}, yielding almost 24% less revenue.
To solve problem AP-2SLM, consider first the MaxAtt problem defined over the same set of
constraints. Given weights ci ∈ R (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the MaxAtt problem is defined as follows:
maximize
x
n∑
i=1
cixi
subject to x ∈ D
(MaxAtt)
We now show that (MaxAtt) can be reduced to the maximum weighted independent set problem
in a directed acyclic graph with positive vertex weights. An independent set is a set of vertices I
such that there is no edge connecting any two vertices in I. The maximum weighted independent
set problem (MWIS) can be stated as follows:
Definition 3. Maximum Weighted Independent Set Problem: Given a graph G = (V,E) with a
weight function w : V → R, find an independent set I∗ ∈ argmaxI∈I
∑
i∈I w(i), where I is the set
of all independent sets.
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Recall that the dominance relation can be represented as a DAG G which includes an arc (u, v)
whenever u  v. As a result, the condition x ∈ D implies that any feasible solution to (MaxAtt)
represents an independent set in G and maximizing
∑n
i=1 cixi amounts to finding the independent
set maximizing the sum of the weights. Since the dominance relation is a partial order, the DAG
representing the dominance relation is a comparability graph. The following result is particularly
useful.
Theorem 1 (Mo¨hring (1985)). The maximum weighted independent set is polynomially-solvable
for comparability graphs with positive weights.
We are ready to present our first result.
Lemma 1. (MaxAtt) is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. We first show that we can ignore those products with a negative weight. Let Xˆ = {i ∈ X |
ci > 0} and Dˆ = {x ∈ {0, 1}n | ∀s, t ∈ Xˆ, s  t : xs + xt ≤ 1}. Solving (MaxAtt) is equivalent to
solving:
maximize
x
∑
i∈Xˆ
cixi
subject to x ∈ Dˆ
(Reduced MaxAtt)
Indeed, consider an optimal solution x∗ to Problem MaxAtt and assume that there exists i ∈ X
such that ci < 0 and x
∗
i = 1. Define xˆ like x
∗ but with xˆi = 0. xˆ has a strictly greater value for
the objective function in Reduced MaxAtt than x∗ has, and is feasible since setting a component
to zero cannot violate any constraint (i.e., xˆ ∈ D). This contradicts the optimality of x∗. Now
Problem Reduced MaxAtt can be reduced to solving an instance of Problem MWIS in a DAG with
positive weights that corresponds to the dominance relation. This DAG is a comparability graph
and the result follows from Theorem 1.
The next step in solving the assortment problem under the 2SLM relies on a result by Megiddo
Megiddo (1979). Let D be a domain defined by some set of constraints and consider Problem A
maximize
x
n∑
i=1
cixi
subject to x ∈ D
(A)
and its associated Problem B:
maximize
x
a0 +
∑n
i=1 aixi
b0 +
∑n
i=1 bixi
subject to x ∈ D.
(B)
Using this notation, Megiddo’s theorem can be stated as follows.
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Theorem 2 (Megiddo (1979)). If Problem A is solvable within O(p(n)) comparisons and O(q(n))
additions, then Problem B is solvable in O(p(n)(q(n) + p(n))) time.
We are now in position to state our main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3. The assortment problem under the Two-Stage Luce model is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. Recall that the assortment problem under the 2SLM (AP-2SLM) can be formulated as
maximize
x
∑n
i=1 riaixi∑n
i=1 aixi + a0
subject to x ∈ D
(5)
where D = {x ∈ {0, 1}n | ∀s  t : xs + xt ≤ 1}.
The problem of maximizing the numerator in (5) is exactly the MaxAtt problem. By Lemma
1, this is polynomial-time solvable. Now observe that (5) (i.e., problem AP-2SLM) can be seen as
a Problem B. Therefore, by Theorem 2, the assortment problem under the 2SLM is solvable in
polynomial time.
In addition to solving the assortment problem under the 2SLM, Theorem 3 is interesting in that it
solves the assortment problem under a Multinomial Logit with a specific class of constraints. It can
be contrasted with the results by Davis, Gallego, and Topaloglu (2013), where feasible assortments
satisfy a set of totally unimodular constraints. They show that the resulting problem can be solved
as a linear program. However, the 2SLM introduces constraints that are not necessarily totally
unimodular as we now show.
Example 3. Consider X = {1, 2, 3, 4} and 1  3, 1  4, 2  3, 2  4, and 3  4. The constraint
matrix that defines the feasible space (D) for this instance is:
M =

1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1

where each row represents a constraint xu + xv ≤ 1. meaning that just one end of the edge can be
selected at the time. Camion (1965) proved that M is totally unimodular if and only if, for every
(square) Eulerian submatrix A of M ,
∑
i,j aij ≡ 0 (mod 4). Consider the sub-matrix corresponding
to the first, second, and fifth rows and the first, third, and fourth columns
N =
1 1 01 0 1
0 1 1

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Matrix N is eulerian (The sums of every element on each row or on each column is a multiple of
2). But the sum of all elements of N is 6 6≡ 0 (mod 4) and hence M is not totally unimodular.
We close this section by explaining how our results can be extended to a more general setting.
Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov (2014) proposed the general attraction model (GAM) to describe
customer behaviour, that alleviates some deficiencies of the MNL. More specifically, the intuition
behind this choice model is that whenever a product is not offered, then its absence can potentially
increase the probability of the no-purchase alternative, as consumers can potentially look for the
product elsewhere, or at a later time. To achieve this effect, for each product j the model considers
two different weights: vj and wj , usually with 0 ≤ wj ≤ vj . If product j is offered, then its
preference weight is vj . But if j is not offered, then the preference weight of the outside option is
increased by wj . For all j ∈ X, let v˜j = vj − wj and v˜0 = v0 +
∑
k∈X wk. Using this notation, the
probabilities associated with the GAM model can be recovered by means of the following equation:
ρ(j, S) =

vj∑
i∈S v˜j+v˜0
if j ∈ S,
0 if j /∈ S.
(6)
Observe that the resulting assortment problem will has the same functional form than problem
AP-2SLM, with a slight modification on the coefficients in the denominator. Thus, we can apply the
same solution technique described in Theorem 3 to find the optimal assortment for the GAM.
6 The Capacitated Assortment Problem
In many applications, the number of products in an assortment is limited, giving rise to capacitated
assortment problems. Let C (1 ≤ C ≤ n) be the maximum number of products allowed in an
assortment. The Capacitated Assortment Problem under the Two-Stage Luce Model (C2SLMAP) is
given by
maximize
x
∑n
i=1 riaixi∑n
i=1 aixi + a0
subject to x ∈ DC
(C2SLMAP)
where DC = {x ∈ {0, 1}n | ∀(s, t) ∈ R xs+xt ≤ 1∧
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ C}. As before, it is useful to define
its capacitated maximum-attractiveness counterpart (C-MaxAtt), i.e.,
maximize
x
n∑
i=1
cixi
subject to x ∈ DC
(C-MaxAtt)
This section first proves that the capacitated assortment problem under the 2SLM is NP-hard. The
reduction uses the Maximum Weighted Budgeted Independent Set (MWBIS) problem proposed by
Bandyapadhyay (2014) which amounts to finding a maximum weighted independent set of size not
greater than C. Kalra et al. (2017) showed that Problem (MWBIS) is NP-hard for bipartite graphs.
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Theorem 4. Problem (C2SLMAP) is NP-hard (under Turing reductions).
It is interesting to mention that Problem (C-MaxAtt) is equivalent to finding an anti-chain of
maximum weight among those of cardinality at most C. This problem (MWLA) was proposed by
Shum and Trotter (1996) and its complexity was left open, but the above results show that it is
also NP-hard. Bandyapadhyay (2014) studied Problem (MWBIS) for various types of graphs (e.g.,
trees and forests), but the dominance relation of the 2SLM can never be a tree since it is transitive
(unless we consider a graph with a single vertex).
In light of this NP-hardness result, the rest of this section presents polynomial-time algorithms
for two special cases of the dominance relation.
6.1 The Two-Stage Luce model over Tree-Induced Dominance Relations
Let R be the transitive reduction of the irreflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation . This
section considers the capacitated assortment problem when the relation R can be represented as
a tree. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the tree contains all products. Otherwise, we
can add another product with zero weight that dominates all original products. This new product
will be the root of the tree and the products not in the original tree will be the children of the root.
Similarly, the same transformation applies to the case when R is a forest. Here all the trees in
the forest will be children of the new product.
We show how to solve Problem (C-MaxAtt). The result follows again by applying Megiddo’s
theorem. The first step of the algorithm simply removes all products with negative weight: Their
children can be added to the parent of the deleted vertex. The main step then solves (C-MaxAtt)
bottom-up using dynamic programming from the leaves. For simplicity, we present the recurrence
relations to compute the weight of the optimal assortment. It is easy to recover the optimal
assortment itself. The recurrence relations compute two functions:
1. A(k, c) which returns the weight of an optimal assortment using product k and its descendants
in the tree representation of R for a capacity c;
2. A+(S, c) which, given a set S of vertices that are children of a vertex k, returns the weight
of an optimal assortment using the products in S and their descendants for a capacity c.
The key intuition behind the recurrence is as follows. If v is a vertex and v1 and v2 are two of
its children, v1 does not dominate v2 or any of its descendants. Hence, it suffices to compute the
best assortments producing A(v1, 0), . . . ,A(v1, C) and A(v2, 0), . . . ,A(v2, C) and to combine them
optimally. The recurrence relations are defined as follows (v ∈ X and 1 ≤ c ≤ C):
A(v, 0) = 0;
A(v, c) = max(cv,A+(children(v), c));
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and
A+(∅, 0) = 0;
A+(S, c) = max
n1,n2≥0
n1+n2=c
A+(S \ {e}, n1) +A(e, n2) where e = argmax
i∈S
ci.
where children(p) denotes the children of product p in the tree. Note that A+(S, c) is computed
recursively to obtain the best assortment from the products in S and their descendants. Using
these recurrence relation, the following Theorem follows:
Theorem 5. Let  a dominance relation whose relation R is a tree containing all products. The
capacitated assortment problem under the 2SLM and  is polynomial-time solvable.
6.2 The Attractiveness-Correlated Two-Stage Luce model
The second special case considers a dominance relation that is correlated with attractiveness.
Definition 4 (Attractiveness-Correlated Two-Stage Luce model). A Two-Stage Luce model is
attractiveness-correlated if the dominance relation satisfies the following two conditions:
1. If x  y, then ax > ay.
2. If x  y and az > ax, then z  y.
The first condition simply expresses that product x can only dominate product y if the attractive-
ness of x is greater than the attractiveness of y. The second condition ensures that, if x dominates
y, then any product whose attractiveness is greater than x also dominates y. The induced domi-
nance relation is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive. A particular case of this model, is the
Threshold Luce model.
When customers follow the Threshold Luce model, they form their consideration sets based on
the attractiveness of products. Without loss of generality, we can assume a1 ≥ a2 ≥ . . . ≥ an,
unless stated otherwise. For a set S, the associated consideration set c(S) may be a proper subset
of S, but for the purpose of assortment optimization, we don’t have incentives to offer sets including
products that are not even consider by customers, so we can restrict our search for optimal solutions
to sets where c(S) = S. A necessary and sufficient condition for this to happen is maxi∈S aimini∈S ai ≤ 1 + t.
Meaning that largest ratio between attractiveness is not greater than 1+t, so no dominance relation
appears.
The firm now needs to carefully balance the inclusion of high-attractiveness products and their
prices to maximize the revenue. In the following example we show that revenue ordered assortments
are not optimal under the Threshold Luce Model. In fact, this strategy can be arbitrarily bad.
Example 4 (Revenue ordered assortments are not optimal). Consider the following product con-
figuration. Let N + 1 products, with prices p1 for the first product, and αp1 for the rest of them,
with α < 1. The attractiveness for all products is a1 for the first product and γa1 for all the rest,
17
such as in the presence of product 1, all the rest of the products are ignored. To complete the
set up, let a0 the attractiveness of the outside option. The best revenue ordered assortment is to
consider product 1, given a revenue of:
R′ = R({1}) = p1a1
a1 + a0
But, if N is big enough (at least bigger than 1αγ ), is more profitable to show SN = X \ {1},
resulting in a revenue of:
R∗ = R(SN ) =
N · αp1γa1
N · αγa1 + a0
Now, if we calculate the ratio if this two values, R′ and R∗ and let N tend to infinity we have:
R′
R∗
= lim
N→∞
p1a1
a1+a0
N ·αp1γa1
N ·αγa1+a0
R′
R∗
= lim
N→∞
p1a1
a1 + a0
· N · αγa1 + a0
N · αp1γa1
R′
R∗
=
a1
a1 + a0
(7)
Observe that this last expression is the market share of offering just product 1, which can
be arbitrarily bad by either making a1 as small as desired, or making the outside option more
attractive.
The capacitated assortment optimization can be solved in polynomial time under the Attractiveness-
Correlated Two-Stage Luce model. Consider an assortment whose product with the largest attrac-
tiveness is k. This assortment cannot contain any product dominated by k. Moreover, if k1 and k2
are two other products in this assortment, then k1 cannot dominate k2 since k would also dominate
k2. As a result, consider the set
Xk = {i ∈ X | ai ≤ ak & k 6 i}.
No product in Xk dominates any other product in Xk and hence the C2SLMAP reduces to a tradi-
tional assortment problem under the MNL. This idea is formalized in Algorithm 1, where CMLMAP
is a traditional algorithm for the MNL. The algorithm considers each product in turn and the
products that it does not dominate and applies a traditional capacitated assortment optimization
under the MNL. The best such assortment is the solution to the capacitated assortment under the
attractiveness-correlated 2SLM.
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Algorithm 1: Capacitated Assortment Optimization under the Attractiveness-Correlated
2SLM.
Data: X,, r, a
Result: Optimal Assortment S∗
R(S∗) = 0 for k = 1, . . . , n do
Xk = {i ∈ X | ai ≤ ak & k 6 i}
Sk = CMLMAP(Xk, r, a)
if R(Sk) > R(S
∗) then
S∗ = Sk
end
end
return S∗
Theorem 6. C2SLMAP can be solved in polynomial time for Attractiveness-Correlated instances.
Proof. To show correctness, it suffices to show that the optimal assortment must be a subset of
one of the Xk (1 ≤ k ≤ n). Let A be the optimal assortment and assume that k is its product
with the largest attractiveness (break ties randomly). A must be included in Xk since otherwise
it would contain a product x such that k  x (contradicting feasibility) or such that a(x) >
a(k) (contradicting our hypothesis). The correctness then follows since there is no dominance
relationship between any two elements in each of Xk. The claim of polynomial-time solvability
follows from the availability of polynomial-time algorithms for the assortment problem under the
MNL and the fact that are exactly n calls to such an algorithm.
7 Joint Assortment and Pricing under the Threshold Luce model
The previous sections provides solutions to the Assortment Optimization problem under the Two-
Stage Luce model. This section aims at determining how to assign prices to products in order to
maximise the expected revenue. It studies the Joint Assortment and Pricing Problem under the
Threshold Luce model, by making the attractiveness of each product dependent upon its price.
Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be the price vector, where such that pi ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} represents the price of
product i. Since the price will affect the attractiveness ai of product i, the presentation makes this
dependency explicit by writing ai(pi) whose form in this paper is specified by
ai(pi) = exp(ui − pi) (8)
where ui is the intrinsic utility of product i and the value vi = ui − pi is called the net utility of
product i. Assigning an infinite price to a product is equivalent to not offering the product, as the
attractiveness, and therefore the probability of selecting the product, becomes 0. Without loss of
generality, products are indexed in a decreasing order by intrinsic utility.
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i ui pi ai(pi) p
′
i ai(p
′
i)
1 ln(10) ln(3) 3.3 ln(4) 2.5
2 ln(8) ln(3) 2.6 ln(4) 2
3 ln(6) ln(3) 2 ln(3) 2
4 ln(3) ln(3) 1 ln(2) 1.5
Table 1: Summary of utilities, prices and attractiveness for the two proposed scenarios.
1
a1(p1) = 3.3
2
a2(p2) = 2.6
3
a3(p3) = 2
4
a4(p4) = 1
Figure 2: The DAG for the first scenario where all prices are fixed to ln(3) and the threshold is
t = 0.5. Product 1 dominates products 3 and 4, and product 2 dominates product 4.
1
a1(p
′
1) = 2.5
2
a2(p
′
2) = 2
3
a3(p
′
3) = 2
4
a4(p
′
4) = 1.5
Figure 3: The DAG for the second scenario where all prices are fixed to (ln(4), ln(4), ln(3), ln(2))b
and the threshold is t = 0.5. Only product 1 dominates product 4.
The following definition is an extension of the definition of a consideration set given an assort-
ment S when each product i has a price pi.
Definition 5. Given an assortment S, a price vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) and a threshold t, the
consideration set c(S, p) for the Threshold Luce model is defined as:
c(S, p) = {j ∈ S | 6 ∃i ∈ S : ai(pi) > (1 + t)aj(pj)}. (9)
The influence of the price vector over the dominance relations is given by the following example:
Example 5. [Price effect on the dominance relation] Consider the Threshold Luce model defined
over X = {1, 2, 3, 4} with utilities u1 = ln(10), u2 = ln(8), u3 = ln(6) and u4 = ln(3), and consider
first a scenario where all products have the same price pi = ln(3) ∀i = 1, . . . , 4. Consider also
a second scenario with prices equal to p′1 = ln(4), p′2 = ln(4), p′3 = ln(3) and p′4 = ln(2). For a
threshold t = 0.5, we have that i  j iff ai(pi) > 1.5 aj(pj). A table summarizing the utilities, prices,
and attractiveness for both scenarios is given in Table 1 and the DAGs depicting the dominance
relations for the two scenarios are given in Figures 2 and 3.
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It is also necessary to update the definition of ρ in Definition 1, since it now depends on the
price of all products in the assortment. The definition of ρ : X ∪ {0} × 2X × (R+ ∪∞)n → [0, 1]
becomes:
ρ(i, S, p) =

ai(pi)∑
j∈c(S,p) aj(pj)+a0
, if i ∈ c(S, p),
0 if i /∈ c(S, p).
(10)
where a0 is the attractiveness of the outside option.
The expected revenue (ER) of an assortment S ⊆ X and a price vector p ∈ Rn+ is given by
R(S, p) =
∑
i∈c(S,p)
ρ(i, S, p)pi. (ER)
A pair (S, p) with S ⊆ X and p ∈ (R+ ∪∞)n is valid if S = {i : pi <∞} and c(S, p) = S. Let
V be the set of all valid pairs (S, p). Observe that one can always restrict the search for optimal
solutions to V. Indeed, all dominated products can be given an infinite price and removing them
from the original assortment yields the exact same revenue.
The Joint Assortment and Pricing problem aims at finding a set S∗ and a price vector p∗
satisfying
(S∗, p∗) ∈ argmax
(S,p)∈V
R(S, p)
and yielding an optimal revenue of
R∗ = R(S∗, p∗).
First observe that the strategy used to solve this problem under the multinomial logit does not
carry over to the Threshold Luce Model. Under the multinomial logit, the optimal solution for
the joint assortment and pricing problem is a fixed adjusted margin policy (Wang, 2012) which,
for equal price sensitivities and normalised costs, translates to a fixed price policy. As shown in Li
and Huh (2011), the optimal solution for the pricing problem under the multinomial logit can be
expressed in closed form using the Lambert function W (x) : [0,∞) → [0,∞) which is defined as
the unique function satisfying:
x = W (x)eW (x) ∀x ∈ [0,∞). (11)
Using this function, the optimal revenue can be expressed as:
R∗ = W
(∑
i∈X exp(ui − 1)
a0
)
(12)
The prices are all equal and satisfy: pi = 1 + R
∗ ∀i ∈ X. The following example shows that
fixed-price policy is not optimal under the Threshold Luce Model.
Example 6 (Fixed-Price policy is not optimal). Consider 11 products with product 1 having utility
u = 2 and all remaining 10 products having utility u′ = 1. Consider a0 = 1 and t = 1. Observe
that, for any fixed price, product 1 always dominates the other 10 products having lower utility, as
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exp(u− u′) = exp(1) = e > (1 + t) = 2. Therefore, the optimal revenue for a a fixed price strategy
is:
Rfixed = W
(
exp(u− 1)
a0
)
= W (e) = 1.
As a result, the 10 lower utility products are completely ignored and only product 1 contributes to
the revenue.
Consider the following price scheme now: let the price for product 1 be p = 1.8 and let the
price be p′ = 1.4 for the remaining products. Product 1 does not dominate any other product now.
Indeed, for any 1 < k ≤ 11,
a1
ak
= exp((u− p)− (u′ − p′)) = exp((2− 1.8)− (1− 1.4)) ≈ 1.822 < 1 + t = 2,
which yields a revenue of:
R′ =
p · exp(u− p) + 10 · p′ exp(u′ − p′)
exp(u− p) + 10 · exp(u′ − p′) + a0 =
1.8 · exp(2− 1.8) + 10 · 1.4 exp(1− 1.4)
exp(2− 1.8) + 10 · exp(1− 1.4) + 1 ≈ 1.298,
This pricing scheme improves upon the fixed-price policy, yielding a revenue almost %30 higher.
The intuition behind this example is as follows: For a fixed price strategy, the only factor
affecting dominance is the intrinsic utilities because the prices vanish when calculating the ratio
between two attractiveness. This means that the solution can potentially miss the benefits of low
attractiveness products which are dominated by the most attractive product.
It is thus important to understand the structure of an optimal solution for the Joint Assortment
and Pricing problem under the Threshold Luce model. The first result states that, for any optimal
solution (S∗, p∗), all product prices are greater or equal than R∗, where R∗ denotes the revenue
achieved at optimality.
Proposition 1. In any optimal solution (S∗, p∗), for all i ∈ S∗, p∗i ≥ R∗.
The proof is by contradiction: Removing products with a price lower than R∗ yields a greater
revenue. The next proposition characterises the optimal assortment of products of any optimal
solution to the Joint Assortment and Pricing problem. Recall that the products are indexed by
decreasing utility ui. Thus, the set of products [k] := {1, . . . , k}, (with 0 < k ≤ n) is said to be an
intrinsic utility ordered set. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 2. Let (S∗, p∗) denote an optimal solution. Then S∗ = [k] for some k ≤ n.
The following Lemma due to Wang and Sahin (2018) is useful to prove some of the upcoming
propositions. For completeness, its proof is also in Appendix A.
Lemma 2 (Lemma 1, Wang and Sahin (2018)). Let H(pi, pj) := pi · exp(ui−pi)+pj · exp(uj−pj),
where exp(ui − pi) + exp(uj − pj) = T . Then, H(pi, pj) is strictly unimodal with respect to pi or
pj, and it achieves the maximum at the following point:
p∗i = p
∗
j = ln ((exp(ui) + exp(uj))/T ) (13)
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Observe that setting the price of a product to ∞ is equivalent to not showing it to consumers.
By Proposition 2, one can always find an optimal solution that is intrinsic utility ordered. Given a
price vector p ∈ Rn, let γ(p) : Rn → [n] be defined as γ(p) .= {maxi∈[n] i s.t pi <∞}. Intuitively,
this is the last non-infinite price. Proposition 3 shows that, at optimality, the finite prices are
non-increasing in i, meaning that lower prices are assigned to lower utility products.
Proposition 3. The prices at an optimal solution (S∗, p∗) satisfy p∗i ≥ p∗i+1 ∀i ∈ [γ(p)− 1].
Moreover, if i, j ∈ S∗ satisfy ui = uj, then p∗i = p∗j .
Recall that the net utility of product i was defined as: vi = ui − pi. The following proposition
shows that at optimality, net utility follows the same order as intrinsic utility.
Proposition 4. Let p∗ be the price of an optimal solution of the Joint Assortment and Pricing
Problem. The following condition holds: ui − p∗i ≥ ui+1 − p∗i+1 ∀i ∈ [γ(p)− 1].
The above propositions make it possible to filter out non-efficient assortments and prices by
restricting the search space to intrinsic utility ordered assortments and providing insights on how
the optimal solution behaves regarding prices and their relation with utilities. Based on these
propositions, the joint assortment and pricing optimisation problem for the TLM can be written
in a more succinct way. From Proposition 2, the solution is an intrinsic utility ordered set Sk = [k]
for some k ≤ n. Suppose there exists an optimal solution in the form (Sk, p) for a fixed value k.
In that case, recall that it is sufficient to restrict to valid pairs (Sk, p), meaning that c(Sk, p) = Sk.
Consider a fixed k ≤ n. By Proposition 4, at optimality, ui − pi ≥ uj − pj ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ k.
Therefore, the condition that c(Sk, p) = Sk can be written as
gij(p) := exp(ui − pi)− (1 + t) · exp(uj − pj) ≤ 0, ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ k (14)
As a result, the joint k-assortment and pricing optimisation problem for the TLM (JAPTLM-k),
which aims at finding an optimal assortment Sk of size k with k ≤ n, can be written as:
maximize
p
R(k)(p) :=
∑
i∈Sk pi · exp(ui − pi)∑
i∈Sk exp(ui − pi) + a0
subject to gij(p) ≤ 0, ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ k
(JAPTLM-k)
Note that, if exp(u1 − uk) ≤ (1 + t), then the solution is the same as the unconstrained case,
because any fixed price can be assigned without creating dominances. Hence, the optimal revenue
R(k) can be calculated using equation (12), and all prices are equal to 1 + R(k). On the other
hand, if exp(u1 − uk) > 1 + t, as in Example 6, the prices need to be adjusted in order to avoid
dominances.
The next theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 7. Problem JAPTLM-k can be solved in polynomial time.
The intuition behind the proof is based on Proposition 4 and the study of the Lagrangean
relaxation of problem (JAPTLM-k). Observe that, since ui − pi ≥ uj − pj (i ≤ j) at optimality,
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then the largest ratio between attractiveness is obtained for products 1 and k. This ratio can also
occur for more products but only if they have the same net utility as products 1 or k. Thus, it must
be the case that there are non-negative integers k1 and k2 with k1+k2 ≤ k, such that letting I1 = [k1]
and I2 = {k − k2 + 1, k − k2 + 2, . . . , k}, the set of constraints C(k1, k2) = {gij(p) | i ∈ I1, j ∈ I2}
are satisfied at equality for the optimal solution (see the proof in Appendix A for details). Since it
is only necessary to study a polynomial number of combinations of constraints satisfied at equality
and, for each one of those combinations a closed form solution is provided, the result follows.
For the non-trivial case with exp(u1 − uk) > 1 + t, where a fixed price fails to be optimal, the
prices need to be adjusted in order to avoid the dominances. Let R(k) and p(k) be the optimal
revenue and price vector. The following Lemma characterizes the structure of the optimal solution
for problem JAPTLM-k.
Lemma 3. The optimal solution to problem (JAPTLM-k) is either the same as the unconstrained
case (i.e. fixed price, in the case that exp(u1 − uk) ≤ (1 + t)) or the following holds at optimality:
a1(p1)
ak(pk)
= 1 + t. (15)
Moreover, there are non-negative integers k∗1, k∗2, with k∗1 + k∗2 ≤ k such that:
R(k) = W

(
k∗1 +
k∗2
1+t
)
· exp
(
(1+t)
∑
i∈I1 ui+
∑
i∈I2 ui+k
∗
2 ln(1+t)
k∗1(1+t)+k
∗
2
− 1
)
+
∑
i∈I¯k exp(ui − 1)
a0
 ,
where I1 = [k
∗
1], I2 = {k− k∗2 + 1, k− k∗2 + 2, . . . , k} and I¯k = [k] \ (I1 ∪ I2). The optimal prices can
be obtained as follows:
p
(k)
i =

1 +R(k) + ui − (1+t)
∑
i∈I1 ui+
∑
i∈I2 ui+k
∗
2 ln(1+t)
k∗1(1+t)+k
∗
2
if i ∈ I1,
1 +R(k) + ui − (1+t)
∑
i∈I1 ui+
∑
i∈I2 ui+k
∗
2 ln(1+t)
k∗1(1+t)+k
∗
2
+ ln(1 + t) if i ∈ I2,
1 +R(k) if i ∈ I¯k.
(16)
Let TLM-Opt(X,u, a0, k) be the procedure to obtain the optimal solution for problem (JAPTLM-k).
Using TLM-Opt(X,u, a0, k) at most n times (once for each k ≤ n) to obtain the assortment and
prices yielding the highest R(k), one can find the optimal assortment and price vector for any given
instance. Its intuition is to mimic the optimal strategy for the regular MNL (Fixed-Price Policy)
as much as possible. However, given that it needs to accommodate prices in order to avoid domi-
nances, the algorithm adjusts prices for the higher intrinsic utility products (making prices larger,
hence less attractive) and reduces the price of lower intrinsic utility ones, making them more attrac-
tive for customers and preventing them from being dominated. This allows the optimal strategy
to have an edge over strategies ignoring the Threshold induced dominances, such as Fixed-Price
Policy and, to a lesser extent, the Quasi-Same Price (Wang and Sahin, 2018). The Quasi-Same
Price policy policy only adjusts the price of the lowest attractiveness product, instead of adjusting
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both extremes of the attractiveness spectrum and potentially multiple products.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper studies the assortment optimization problem under the Two-Stage Luce model (2SLM),
a discrete choice model introduced by Echenique and Saito (2018) that generalizes the standard
multinomial logit model (MNL) with a dominance relation and may violate regularity. The paper
proved that the assortment problem under the 2SLM can be solved in polynomial time. The paper
also considered the capacitated assortment problem under the 2SLM and proved that the problem
becomes NP-hard in this setting. We also provide polynomial-time algorithms for special cases
of the capacitated problem when (1) the dominance relation is utility-correlated and when (2)
its transitive reduction is a forest. We also provide an Appendix showing numerical experiments
to highlight the performance of the proposed algorithms against classical strategies used in the
literature.
There are at least five interesting avenues for future research. First, one may wish to study how
to generalize the 2SLM further while still keeping the assortment problem solvable in polynomial
time. For example, one can try to check whether there exists a model that unifies the 2SLM and
the elegant work in Davis, Gallego, and Topaloglu (2013) where the assortment problem is still
solvable in polynomial time. Second, given that the capacitated version of the 2SLM is NP-hard
under Turing reductions (Theorem 4), it is interesting to see whether there exist good approximation
algorithms for this problem. Third, one can explore different forms of dominance. For example, one
may consider dominances specified by a discrete relation or a continuous functional form between
products. Fourth, one can try to generalise our results for the Joint Assortment Pricing Problem
under the Threshold Luce model to a more general setting, where price sensitivities depend on each
product. Finally, one can try to mix attention models with dominance relations, meaning that a
customer first perceives a subset of the products, dictated by an attention filter, and then filter the
products even more using dominance relations.
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A Proofs
In this section we provide the proofs missing from the main text.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof considers four problems:
1. Problem (MWBISBP): Maximum weighted independent set of size at most C for bipartite
graphs.
2. Problem (MWEBISBP): Maximum weighted independent set of size equal to C for bipartite
graphs.
3. Problem (EC2SLMAP): Optimal assortment under the General Luce model of size C.
4. Problem (C2SLMAP): Optimal capacitated assortment under the Two-Stage Luce model of size
at most C.
The proof shows that Problems (MWEBISBP), (EC2SLMAP), and (C2SLMAP) are NP-hard, using the
NP-hardness of Problem (MWBISBP) (Kalra et al., 2017) as a starting point.
First observe that Problem (MWEBISBP) is NP-hard under Turing reductions. Indeed, Problem
(MWBISBP) can be reduced to solving C instances of Problem (MWEBISBP) with budget c (1 ≤ c ≤ C).
We now show that Problem (EC2SLMAP) is NP-hard. Consider Problem (MWEBISBP) over a
bipartite graph G = (V = V1 ∪ V2, E), where V1 ∩ V2 = ∅, every edge (v1, v2) ∈ E satisfies
v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2, wv is the weight of vertex v, and C is the budget. We show that Problem
(MWEBISBP) over this bipartite graph can be polynomially reduced to Problem (EC2SLMAP). The
reduction assigns each vertex v to a product with a(v) = 1 and rv = wv, sets a0 = 0, and has a
capacity C. Moreover, the reduction uses the following dominance relation: v1  v2 iff (v1, v2) ∈ E.
This dominance relation is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive, since the graph is bipartite. A
solution to Problem (MWEBISBP) is a feasible solution to Problem (EC2SLMAP), since the independent
set cannot contain two vertices v1, v2 with v1  v2 by construction. Similarly, a feasible assortment
is an independent set, since the assortment cannot select two vertices v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2 with
(v1, v2) ∈ E, since v1  v2. The objective function of Problem (EC2SLMAP) reduces to maximizing
1
C
∑
v∈V
rvxv
which is equivalent to maximizing
∑
v∈V rvxv since exactly C products will be selected by every
feasible assortment. The result follows by the NP-hardness of Problem (MWEBISBP).
Finally, Problem (C2SLMAP) is NP-hard under Turing reductions. Indeed, Problem (C2SLMAP)
can be reduced to solving C instances of Problem (EC2SLMAP) with capacity c (1 ≤ c ≤ C).
Proof of Theorem 5 By Theorem 2, it suffices to show that Problem (C-MaxAtt) is solved by
the recurrences in polynomial time. The correctness of recurrence A(v, c) comes from the fact that
vertex v dominates all its descendants and cannot be present in any assortment featuring any of
them. The correctness of recurrence A+(S, c) follows from the fact that e is not dominated by, and
i
does not dominate, any element in S, since they are all children of the same node. This also holds
for the descendants of e and the descendants of the elements in S. Hence, the optimal assortment is
obtained by splitting the capacity c into n1 and n2 and merging the best assortment for A+(S, n1)
and A(e, n2) for some n1, n2 ≥ 0 summing to c. The recurrences can be solved in polynomial time
since the computation for each vertex v and capacity c takes O(n C) time, giving an overall time
complexity of O(n2 C2).
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose p∗i < R
∗ for some i ∈ S, then
Sˆ = S∗ \ {i} has better revenue than the optimal solution if we keep the same prices and p∗i < R∗.
Indeed, let us calculate R(Sˆ):
R(Sˆ) =
∑
j∈Sˆ e
uj−p∗j · p∗j∑
j∈Sˆ e
uj−p∗j + a0
R(Sˆ) =
∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j · p∗j − eui−p
∗
i · p∗i∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j − eui−p∗i + a0
R(Sˆ) =
∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j · p∗j∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j + a0
·
∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j + a0∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j − eui−p∗i + a0
− e
ui−p∗i · p∗i∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j − eui−p∗i + a0
R(Sˆ) =
∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j · p∗j∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j + a0
·
[
1 +
eui−p∗i∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j − eui−p∗i + a0
]
− e
ui−p∗i · p∗i∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j − eui−p∗i + a0
R(Sˆ) =R∗ ·
[
1 +
eui−p∗i∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j − eui−p∗i + a0
]
− e
ui−p∗i · p∗i∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j − eui−p∗i + a0
R(Sˆ) =R∗ +
eui−p∗i∑
j∈S∗ e
uj−p∗j − eui−p∗i + a0
· [R∗ − p∗i ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
Now Γ is positive because p∗i < R
∗, but this implies R(Sˆ) > R∗, contradicting the optimality
of R∗.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let (S∗, p∗) be an optimal solution. We can assume that (S∗, p∗) ∈ V.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there is a product i not included in the optimal solution
and another product j with smaller intrinsic utility included in S∗. We show that we can include
product i, and remove j and get a greater revenue. Let Sˆ = (S∗ \ {j}) ∪ {i}, be the set where
we removed product j, and included product i. Let pˆi = ui − uj + p∗j , this means that the total
attractiveness remains unchanged, and no new domination relations appear, given that product j
already had the same level attractiveness that product i now has. Observe that given that ui ≥ uj ,
we have that pˆi ≥ p∗j . Let us calculate R(Sˆ, pˆ), where pˆ is the same as p∗, but with the proposed
changes in price:
ii
R(Sˆ, pˆ) =
∑
k∈Sˆ e
uk−pˆk · pˆk∑
k∈Sˆ e
uk−pˆk + a0
R(Sˆ, pˆ) =
∑
k∈S∗ e
uk−p∗k · p∗k − euj−p
∗
j · p∗j + eui−pˆi · pˆi∑
k∈Sˆ e
uk−pˆk + a0
R(Sˆ, pˆ) =
∑
k∈S∗ e
uk−p∗k · p∗k∑
k∈S∗ euk−pˆk + a0︸ ︷︷ ︸
R∗
+
eui−pˆi · pˆi − euj−p∗j · p∗j∑
k∈Sˆ e
uk−pˆk + a0
R(Sˆ, pˆ) = R∗ +
euj−p
∗
j∑
k∈Sˆ e
uk−pˆk + a0︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
· [pˆi − p∗j]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
R(Sˆ, pˆ) > R∗
Where we first rewrite R(Sˆ, pˆ) using (S∗, p∗) because we just swapped product i for product
j, and the total attractiveness remain the same, so the denominator does not change. Then we
identify R(S, p), and we use ui − pˆi = uj − pj to being able to factorize the remaining terms. So
we found a pair (Sˆ, pˆ), yielding strictly more revenue than (S, p), but adding product i, which
contradicts the optimality of (S∗, p∗).
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof (due to Wang and Sahin (2018)) is useful because it provides
intuition on how the optimal price variates when constrained to a fixed additive market share
among any two products. By the equality constraint, we have pj = uj − ln(T − exp(ui − pi)), so
H(pi, pj) can be rewritten purely as a function of pi as:
H(pi) = pi · exp(ui − pi) + (uj − ln(T − exp(ui − pi))) · (T − exp(ui − pi)). (17)
Now, let us calculate the first derivative of H(pi) w.r.t. pi:
∂H(pi)
∂pi
= (−pi + (uj − ln(T − exp(ui − pi)))) · exp(ui − pi) (18)
Clearly the left-hand side term on the multiplication is monotonically decreasing from positive to
negative values as pi increases from 0 to ∞. Therefore H(pi) is strictly unimodal and reaches its
maximum value at:
p∗i = p
∗
j = ln ((exp(ui) + exp(uj))/T ) .
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove this result by contradiction. Let i be the first index where
this condition does not hold, this means that p∗i < p
∗
i+1. Using Lemma 2, we found pˆ satisfying
p∗i < pˆ < p
∗
i+1. Does this new price alter the consideration set? We show that this is not the case.
Indeed, the effect is two-fold: the price for product i increases, and the price for product i + 1
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decreases. We analyse the effect of these two consequences:
• Increase on price for product i: This means a(i, p) decreases. Note that ui− pˆ ≥ ui+1− p∗i+1,
so neither i  i+ 1 or i+ 1  i, because their attractiveness are now even closer than before.
Can i be dominated now by another product? No, because given that ui ≥ ui+1 we have
ui − pˆ ≥ ui+1 − pˆ ≥ ui+1 − p∗i+1. Therefore the new attractiveness of i is still larger than the
new attractiveness of i+ 1, and the last inequality implies that the new attractiveness of i is
larger than the old attractiveness of i+ 1, and i+ 1 was not previously dominated either by
any other product.
• Decrease on price for product i+1: Previously i+ 1 was not dominated by any product. Can
i+ 1 be dominated now? No, because if i+ 1 was not dominated before, now with a smaller
price pˆ its attractiveness is larger and therefore can’t be dominated now either (the only other
product that changed attractiveness was i, and it now has smaller attractiveness). Can i+ 1
dominate another product now with its new higher attractiveness? No, because given that
ui ≥ ui+1 we have ui − p∗i ≥ ui+1 − p∗i ≥ ui+1 − pˆ, so the old attractiveness of product i
is larger than the new attractiveness of product i+ 1, and given that i did not dominate
another product before, the new price does not make i+ 1 dominate another product either.
So, letting pfix exactly the same as p∗, but replacing both p∗i and p
∗
i+1 with pˆ, means that the
pair (S∗, pfix) yields strictly more revenue than (S∗, p∗) (by Lemma 2), contradicting the optimality
assumption. The fact that equal intrinsic utility implies equal price at optimality, can be easily
demonstrated by the following: if two equal intrinsic utility products have different prices, then
using Lemma 2 we obtain strictly better revenue by assigning them the same price, and no new
domination occurs, because the new price is confined between the previous prices.
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove this by contradiction. Let p∗ be the optimal solution and i
be the first index where this condition does not hold. This means that ui − p∗i < ui+1 − p∗i+1. We
can extrapolate this inequality further and say:
ui+1 − p∗i < ui − p∗i < ui+1 − p∗i+1 < ui − p∗i+1, (19)
because ui ≥ ui+1 and pi ≥ pi+1 by Propositions 2 and 3 respectively. We now do the following:
Define p′i and p
′
i+1 such as exp(ui − p′i) + exp(ui+1 − p′i+1) = exp(ui − p∗i ) + exp(ui+1 − p∗i+1) and
exp(ui − p′i) = exp(ui+1 − p′i+1). This means that:
p′i = ui − ln
(
exp(ui − p∗i ) + exp(ui+1 − p∗i+1)
2
)
p′i+1 = ui+1 − ln
(
exp(ui − p∗i ) + exp(ui+1 − p∗i+1)
2
)
Consider H(pi, pi+1) = pi · exp(ui − pi) + pj · exp(ui+1 − pi+1), where exp(ui − pi) + exp(ui −
pi) = exp(ui − p∗i ) + exp(ui+1 − p∗i+1). By Lemma 2, H(pi, pi+1) is strictly increasing in pi for
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pi ≤ pˆ and strictly decreasing for pi ≥ pˆ, with pˆ = ln
(
exp(ui)+exp(ui+1)
exp(ui−p∗i )+exp(ui+1−p∗i+1)
)
the solution of
the corresponding maximization problem of Lemma 2. We can verify that pˆ < p′i < p
∗
i . The first
inequality is straightforward. Indeed:
p′i =ui − ln
(
exp(ui − pi) + exp(ui+1 − pi+1)
2
)
p′i = ln
[
2 exp(ui)
exp(ui − p∗i ) + exp(ui+1 − p∗i+1)
]
p′i > ln
[
exp(ui) + exp(ui+1)
exp(ui − p∗i ) + exp(ui+1 − p∗i+1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pˆ
p′i >pˆ
proving the desired inequality. Now, for the second one:
p′i = ui − ln
(
exp(ui − pi) + exp(ui+1 − pi+1)
2
)
p′i = ln
[
2 exp(ui)
exp(ui − p∗i ) + exp(ui+1 − p∗i+1)
]
p′i ≤ ln
[
2 exp(ui)
exp(ui − p∗i ) + exp(ui − p∗i+1)
]
p′i = ln
[
2 exp(ui)
exp(ui)(exp(−p∗i ) + exp(−p∗i+1))
]
p′i < ln
[
2
2 exp(−p∗i )
]
p′i < p
∗
i ,
thus we have:
p′i · exp(ui − p′i) + p′i+1 · exp(ui+1 − p′i+1) > p∗i · exp(ui − p∗i ) + p∗i+1 · exp(ui+1 − p∗i+1).
Meaning that we have the same assortment, but with prices p′i and p
′
i+1 generating strictly more
revenue than the optimal prices, which is a contradiction. The only thing that we have left to show
that with these new prices we are still on the same consideration set. It would be enough to show
that the new net utilities are bounded by previous values of net utilities. Indeed, we can verify
that p∗i+1 ≤ p′i+1 ≤ p′i ≤ p∗i , by simply using the definitions. We also know, by hypothesis that
ui − p′i = ui+1 − p′i+1, then ui − p′i = ui+1 − p′i+1 ≤ ui+1 − p∗i+1. So even when the price of product
i decreased, the new attractiveness is bounded above by a previously existing attractiveness, thus
not changing the consideration set. By the same reasoning, ui+1−p′i+1 = ui−p′i ≥ ui−p∗i , meaning
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that the new attractiveness is bounded below by a pre-existing one, so i+ 1 is not dominated with
this new prices either. So the consideration set stays the same, concluding the proof.
Proof of Theorem 7. We first write problem (JAPTLM-k) in minimization form to directly apply
the Karush-Khun-Tucker conditions (KKT)(Karush, 1939).
minimize
p
−R(k)(p)
subject to gij(p) ≤ 0, ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ k
(20)
The associated Lagrangean function is:
Lk(p, µ) = −R(k)(p) +
∑
1≤i<j≤k
µij · gij(p), (21)
where µij ≥ 0 are the associated Lagrange multipliers. Recall that if exp(u1 − uk) ≤ (1 + t), the
optimal revenue R(k) can be calculated using equation (12), and the solution corresponds to a fixed
price policy as for the regular multinomial logit.
On the other hand, if exp(u1− uk) > (1 + t), any fixed price causes product k to be dominated
by product 1. Thus, to include product k in the assortment we need to adjust the prices. Let
p = (p1, . . . , pk) be the optimal price vector for problem (20). Observe that it can’t happen that
a1(p1)
ak(pk)
< 1+t, since by Proposition 4, it will also means that a1(p1)a2(p2) < 1+t and using Lemma 2 we can
find pˆ such that assigning pˆ to products 1 and 2 yields a larger revenue (and no dominance relation
appears, since the attractiveness of product 1 was reduced, and the attractiveness of product 2
increased, but is still less than the one of product 1), which contradicts optimality. Therefore, g1k
must be satisfied with equality, meaning a1(p1)ak(pk) = 1 + t.
Furthermore, at optimality it holds ui − pi ≥ uj − pj ∀i ≤ j (by Proposition 4), and thus the
biggest ratio between attractiveness is observed for products 1 and k, and is exactly equal to 1 + t.
This ratio can be replicated for other pairs of products, but only if they share the same net utility
(and thus attractiveness) to the one of products 1 or k. Therefore, it must be the case that there are
integers k1 and k2 with k1 +k2 ≤ k, such that all products in I1 = [k1] share the same attractiveness
(a1(p1)) and all products in I2 = {k − k2 + 1, k − k2 + 2, . . . , k} share the same attractiveness as
well (ak(pk)). This means that the set of constraints C(k1, k2) = {gij(p) | i ∈ I1, j ∈ I2} are all
satisfied with equality at optimality.
We now study the derivative of equation (21) with respect to each price pi to obtain the KKT
conditions. We here assume that the first k1 values share the same net utility value, meaning
us = u1 − p1 = ui − pi ∀i ∈ I1, and for the last k2 products, we also have the same value of net
utility, that we call uf , this is: uf = uk−pk = ui−pi ∀i ∈ I2. Where these two quantities satisfy:
us − uf = ln(1 + t),
Let us write the derivatives of the Lagrangean depending on where the index i belongs. If i ∈ I1,
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then:
dLk
dpi
=
exp(ui − pi)∑
j∈Sk exp(uj − pj) + a0
·
[
pi − 1−R(k)(p)
]
− exp(ui − pi) ·
∑
j∈I2
µij , (22)
if i ∈ I2, we have:
dLk
dpi
=
exp(ui − pi)∑
j∈Sk exp(uj − pj) + a0
·
[
pi − 1−R(k)(p)
]
+ (1 + t) exp(ui − pi) ·
∑
j∈I1
µji, (23)
And finally, if i ∈ I¯k = [k] \ (i1 ∪ I2), the derivative takes the following form:
dLk
dpi
=
exp(ui − pi)∑
j∈Sk exp(uj − pj) + a0
·
[
pi − 1−R(k)(p)
]
(24)
Observe that ∀i ∈ I¯k, dLkdpi = 0 =⇒ pi = 1 +R(k)(p), and the right hand side is not dependent
on i, so all products in I¯k share the same price, which we denote p¯. We can rewrite all prices and
the revenue depending on us and p¯, using the following relations:
1. ∀i ∈ I1 u1 − p1 = ui − pi =⇒ pi = ui − us
2. ∀i ∈ I2 u1 − p1 = ui − pi + ln(1 + t) =⇒ pi = ui − us + ln(1 + t)
Note now that at optimality, for a fixed k, prices are determined by k1 and k2. Thus, the
optimal revenue can be written explicitly depending on k, k1 and k2, taking the following form:
R(k)(k1, k2) =∑
i∈I1(ui − us) exp(us) + p¯ exp(−p¯)
∑
i∈I¯k exp(ui) +
∑
i∈I2(ui − us + ln(1 + t)) exp(us − ln(1 + t))∑
i∈I1 exp(us) + exp(−p¯)
∑
i∈I¯k exp(ui) +
∑
i∈I2 exp(us + ln(1 + t)) + a0
(25)
Note that p¯ = 1 + R(k)(k1, k2) (Equation (24)) and let E(k1, k2) =
∑
i∈I¯k exp(ui). Using these
two relations, we can rewrite the optimal revenue as:
R(k)(k1, k2) =
eus
∑
i∈I1
(ui − us) + eus1+t ·
∑
i∈I2
(ui − us + ln(1 + t)) + E(k1, k2)(1 +R(k)(k1, k2))e−(1+R(k)(k1,k2))
eus
[
k1 +
k2
1+t
]
+ E(k1, k2)e−(1+R
(k)(k1,k2)) + a0
(26)
Up to this point, we have an equation relating the optimal revenue R(k)(k1, k2) and us. From
equation (22), after reordering terms we have:
pi − 1−R(k)(k1, k2)
eus (k1 + k2(1 + t)) + E(k1, k2)e−(1+R
(k)(k1,k2)) + a0
=
∑
j∈I2
µij , ∀i ∈ I1
ui − us − 1−R(k)(k1, k2)
eus (k1 + k2(1 + t)) + E(k1, k2)e−(1+R
(k)(k1,k2)) + a0
=
∑
j∈I2
µij , ∀i ∈ I1 (27)
vii
Analogously, from equation (23), after reordering terms we have ∀i ∈ I2:
pi − 1−R(k)(k1, k2)
eus (k1 + k2(1 + t)) + E(k1, k2)e−(1+R
(k)(k1,k2)) + a0
= −(1 + t)
∑
j∈I1
µji, ∀i ∈ I2
1
1 + t
· ui − us + ln(1 + t)− 1−R
(k)(k1, k2)
eus (k1 + k2(1 + t)) + E(k1, k2)e−(1+R
(k)(k1,k2)) + a0
= −
∑
j∈I1
µji, ∀i ∈ I2 (28)
Now, if we add equations (27) ∀i ∈ I1 then take equations (28) and also add them ∀i ∈ I2, and
add those two results we can derive the value R(k)(k1, k2) as follows.
∑
i∈I1
j∈I2
µij −
∑
i∈I1
j∈I2
µij
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
=
∑
i∈I1(ui − us − 1−R(k)(k1, k2)) +
∑
i∈I2 (ui−us+ln(1+t)−1−R
(k)(k1,k2))
1+t
eus (k1 + k2(1 + t)) + E(k1, k2)e−(1+R
(k)(k1,k2)) + a0
R(k)(k1, k2)
(
k1 +
k2
1 + t
)
=
∑
i∈I1
ui +
1
1 + t
·
∑
i∈I2
ui − (1 + us) ·
(
k1 +
k2
1 + t
)
+
k2 ln(1 + t)
1 + t
R(k)(k1, k2) =
(1 + t)
∑
i∈I1 ui +
∑
i∈I2 ui + k2 ln(1 + t)
k1(1 + t) + k2
− 1− us (29)
We now have two equations relating R(k)(k1, k2) and us in (26) and (29). Using these equations
we can find the values of the optimal revenues and all the pricing structure while varying k1 and
k2. If we define the following constant:
C1(k1, k2) =
(1 + t)
∑
i∈I1 ui +
∑
i∈I2 ui + k2 ln(1 + t)
k1(1 + t) + k2
− 1, (30)
Equation (29) becomes:
R(k)(k1, k2) = C1(k1, k2)− us, (31)
and from Equation (31), we can deduce the following relations:
1 +R(k)(k1, k2) = C1(k1, k2)− us + 1, and e−(1+R(k)(k1,k2)) = eus−C1(k1,k2)−1. (32)
We will use these relations on Equation (26). Let us first multiply both sides by the denominator
on the right side:
R(k)(k1, k2) ·
(
eus
[
k1 +
k2
1 + t
]
+ E(k1, k2)e
−(1+R(k)(k1,k2)) + a0
)
= eus
∑
i∈I1
(ui − us) + e
us
1 + t
·
∑
i∈I2
(ui − us + ln(1 + t)) + E(k1, k2)(1 +R(k)(k1, k2))e−(1+R(k)(k1,k2))
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using equations (32) to replace the value of R(k)(k1, k2) and write everything depending on us
we have:
(C1(k1, k2)− us)
(
eus
[
k1 +
k2
1 + t
]
+ E(k1, k2)e
us−C1(k1,k2)−1 + a0
)
= eus
∑
i∈I1
(ui − us)
+
eus
1 + t
·
∑
i∈I2
(ui − us + ln(1 + t)) + E(k1, k2) · (C1(k1, k2)− us − 1) eus−C1(k1,k2)−1 (33)
We focus first on the left hand side (LHS) of Equation (33):
LHS = (C1(k1, k2)− us)
(
eus
[(
k1 +
k2
1 + t
)
+ E(k1, k2)e
−C1(k1,k2)−1
]
+ a0
)
For ease of notation, define C2(k1, k2) as:
C2(k1, k2) =
(
k1 +
k2
1 + t
)
+ E(k1, k2)e
−C1(k1,k2)−1 (34)
Rewriting the LHS using the value for C2(k1, k2):
LHS = (C1(k1, k2)− us) [eus · C2(k1, k2) + a0)] (35)
We now focus on the right side (RHS) of equation (33):
RHS =eus
∑
i∈I1
(ui − us) + e
us
1 + t
·
∑
i∈I2
(ui − us + ln(1 + t))
+ E(k1, k2) · (C1(k1, k2)− us − 1) eus−C1(k1,k2)−1
RHS =eus
∑
i∈I1
ui +
1
1 + t
·
∑
i∈I2
ui +
k2 ln(1 + t)
1 + t
− us
(
k1 +
k2
1 + t
)
+ euse−C1(k1,k2)−1E(k1, k2) · (C1(k1, k2)− us + 1)
RHS =eus ·
(
k1 +
k2
1 + t
)
[C1(k1, k2)− us + 1] + euse−C1(k1,k2)−1E(k1, k2) · (C1(k1, k2)− us + 1)
RHS =eus · (C1(k1, k2)− us + 1) ·
[(
k1 +
k2
1 + t
)
+ E(k1, k2) · e−C1(k1,k2)−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2(k1,k2)
RHS =eus · (C1(k1, k2)− us + 1) · C2(k1, k2) (36)
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Putting together equations (35) and (36), we have:
LHS =RHS
(C1(k1, k2)− us) [eus · C2(k1, k2) + a0)] =eus · (C1(k1, k2)− us + 1) · C2(k1, k2)
(C1(k1, k2)− us) eus · C2(k1, k2) + (C1(k1, k2)− us) · a0 = (C1(k1, k2)− us) eus · C2(k1, k2) + eus · C2(k1, k2)
(C1(k1, k2)− us) · a0 =eus · C2(k1, k2)
eus =− a0
C2(k1, k2)
· (us − C1(k1, k2)) (37)
Equation (37) has a known explicit closed form solution, and can be found using the following
Lemma:
Lemma 4. Let a, b 6= 0 and c be real numbers and W (·) be the Lambert function (Corless et al.,
1996). The solution to the transcendental algebraic equation for x:
e−ax = b (x− c) , (38)
is:
x = c+
1
a
·W
(
ae−ac
b
)
. (39)
Proof of Lemma 4. Let us start with equation (38) and find an explicit solution to it.
e−ax = b (x− c)
e−ax+ac−ac = b (x− c) /multiplying both sides by a
b
· ea(x−c)q
a · e−ac
b
= a · (x− c) · ea(x−c) /using definition of W (·) as in Eq. (11)
W
(
ae−ac
b
)
= a · (x− c) /reorganising and isolating x
x = c+
1
a
·W
(
ae−ac
b
)
,
completing the proof.
Identifying terms on equation (37), the solution for us is:
us = C1(k1, k2)−W
(
C2(k1, k2)
a0
· eC1(k1,k2)
)
(40)
Let us call this value us(k, k1, k2), meaning that is a function of the integers k, k1 and k2. To
get the revenue for this specific combination of parameters, we can simply use equation (31), giving
us:
R(k)(k1, k2) = C1(k1, k2)− us(k, k1, k2) (41)
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Thus, the optimal revenue R(k) given a specific integer k can be obtained by:
R(k) = max
k1,k2≥1
k1+k2≤k
R(k)(k1, k2) (42)
Noting that there are O(k2) pairs (k1, k2) to evaluate, the proof follows.
Proof of Lemma 3 The optimal revenue is already calculated in Equation (42). The proof follows
by first obtaining u∗s(k) from Equation (29). Then, for products in I1, the price can be obtained
directly since their net utility is the same as u∗s(k). For products in I2, since g1k is satisfied
with equality, all products share the same net utility and equal to u∗s(k) − ln(1 + t). Finally,
for products in I¯k, we can use the relation provided in equation (24) to obtain the prices. More
explicitly, let (k∗1, k∗2) be the integers satisfying R(k) = R(k)(k∗1, k∗2). To obtain the optimal prices,
let u∗s(k) = us(k, k∗1, k∗2). By Equation (41) u∗s(k) can be written as:
u∗s(k) =
(1 + t)
∑
i∈I1 ui +
∑
i∈I2 ui + k
∗
2 ln(1 + t)
k∗1(1 + t) + k
∗
2
− 1−R(k) (43)
Therefore, the optimal prices are given by:
p
(k)
i (k) =

ui − u∗s(k) if i ∈ I1,
ui − u∗s(k) + ln(1 + t) if i ∈ I2,
1 +R(k) if i ∈ I¯k
(44)
Lemma 5. Fixed-Price policy can be arbitrarily bad for the Joint Assortment and Pricing problem
under the Threshold Luce model.
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider N +1 products, with product one having u > 0 utility and a0 = 1.
For all the remaining N products let their utility to be: αu, with α < 1 such that in presence of
product one, all the rest of the products are ignored for threshold t. The optimal revenue if we
consider a fixed price strategy is (Li and Huh, 2011; Wang, 2012):
R′ = W (exp(u− 1))
Because no matter what fixed price we select, the N lower utility products are completely ignored
and the first product is the only one contributing to the revenue, and this is the best revenue that
we can achieve given that. Now, let us consider the optimal revenue obtained with the strategy
described in Theorem (7)
R∗ = W
([
(1 + t) +N
1 + t
]
· exp
(
(1 + t)(u− 1) +N(αu− 1) +N ln(1 + t)
(1 + t) +N
))
, (45)
let us find an explicit relation between R′ and R∗. Starting from equation (45):
xi
R∗ =W
([
(1 + t) +N
1 + t
]
· exp
(
(1 + t)(u− 1) +N(αu− 1) +N ln(1 + t)
(1 + t) +N
))
R∗ =W
([
(1 + t) +N
1 + t
]
· exp
(
(u− 1) · (1 + t) +Nα
(1 + t) +N
+
N ln(1 + t)
(1 + t) +N
))
R∗ =W
[(1 + t) +N
1 + t
]
· exp
(u− 1) + N
(1 + t) +N
· (ln(1 + t)− (u− 1) · (1− α))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ

We know that the Lambert function is concave, increasing and unbounded (Corless et al., 1996;
Li and Huh, 2011). With this in mind, let u be such that Γ is greater or equal than zero (for
example, setting u = 1.9, α = 0.5 and t = 0.5, makes Γ > 0 and product 1 dominates the rest of
the products), this is:
ln(1 + t)
1− α + 1 ≥ u. (46)
Using this, we have:
R∗ ≥W
([
(1 + t) +N
1 + t
]
· exp (u− 1)
)
(47)
Where the argument of the Lambert function is exactly the same as R∗, but multiplied by a
constant factor larger than one and depending on N . Putting everything together, we have:
R∗ ≥W
([
(1 + t) +N
1 + t
]
· exp (u− 1)
)
≥ R′ (48)
The expression in the middle can be arbitrarily larger than R′ by letting N tend to infinity, and
so is R∗. Thus, the fixed price policy can be arbitrarily bad under the Threshold Luce model.
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B Numerical Experiments
This section present numerical results on the performance of the algorithms developed in Sections 5
and 7, compared against classical algorithms in the literature such as revenue-ordered assortments
for the assortment problem, and pricing policies like Fixed-Price (Li and Huh, 2011) which is optimal
for the conventional MNL, and Quasi-Same price (Wang and Sahin, 2018), which is optimal for
the proposed variant of the MNL including search cost. Quasi-Same Price amounts to have a fixed
price for all products but one (the one having the smallest utility).
We also provide some insights on the factors that influence the nature of the solution and
provide some explanation on the difference in performance between the different strategies.
B.1 Assortment Optimisation
This section presents some numerical results on the performance of revenue-ordered assortments
(RO) against our proposed strategy detailed in Section 5, which we call 2SLM-OPT. In order to
do this, we variate the number of products n, the attractiveness of the outside option a0 and the
density d of the graph, which we use as the probability that a dominance relation is active for each
pair of products‡. Theoretically, as shown in Example 4, the optimality gap can be as large desired.
But in practice, we were able to found gaps as large as 95.40%.
Each tested family or class of instances is defined by essentially three numbers: the number
of products n, the attractiveness of the outside option a0, and the density d, that controls the
probability that a dominance edge exists, and then we also compute the transitive closure over the
resulting graph. It is worth noticing that we did not consider the case a0 = 0 because in those cases,
the optimal solution is simply selecting the highest revenue product and therefore both strategies
coincide. In total, we experimented with 48 classes or families of instances, each containing 250
instances. In each specific instance, revenues and utilities are drawn from an uniform distribution
between 0 and 10. We ran both strategies (RO and 2SLM-OPT) and report the average and worst
optimality gap for the RO strategy. We are not providing running times, because as expected,
2SLM-OPT takes more time than RO, but all instances can be solved very fast in practice (less than
half a second). Table 2 presents the results which can be summarized as follows:
1. The average gap tends to increase with the number of products, reaching about 14% for 30
products. The worst gap is more instance-dependent (as it strongly depends on the dominance
structure, and how revenues are matched with attractiveness) so it can be large both in smaller
and larger instances. However, it tends to increase with the density of the dominance graph,
as it is more likely for RO to choose a product that dominates potential contributors whose
inclusion can be more profitable than keeping the higher attractiveness one.
2. The average gap generally widens as the outside option attractiveness increases. With a
high outside option, we typically expect to select more products to counterbalance the effect
‡used as the probability that an edge in the dominance graph occurs
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of the no-choice alternative. This can amplify the difference between 2SLM-OPT and RO as
the likelihood that the optimal solution turns out to be revenue-ordered decreases, given the
randomness of the dominance relation.
3. With higher densities, is more likely to make a mistake and include a product that dominates
many potential contributors that considered together, might be more profitable. Thus, both
the average and worst gap widens as the density increases in general. The exception occurs
at the higher end of densities where not many products can be included without provoking
dominances. Here the solutions of both strategies tends to be similar and select a few higher
revenue products. This is also interesting from a managerial standpoint: when customers
have more clarity on what products are clearly superior in comparison, this might drift the
offered assortment to be smaller, compared against when customers does not have a clear
hierarchy among products.
xiv
(n, a0, d)
RO Assortments 2SLM-OPT
Avg. Gap (%) Worst Gap (%) Avg. Cardinality Avg. Cardinality
(5,1,0.2) 0.476 48.899 1.484 1.496
(5,1,0.4) 1.532 80.404 1.384 1.376
(5,1,0.8) 2.812 71.888 1.08 1.084
(5,2,0.2) 1.173 73.387 1.82 1.816
(5,2,0.4) 1.827 69.8 1.504 1.536
(5,2,0.8) 4.529 94.759 1.116 1.14
(5,4,0.2) 1.835 69.574 2.108 2.104
(5,4,0.4) 3.133 61.627 1.784 1.82
(5,4,0.8) 5.378 69.555 1.2 1.228
(5,8,0.2) 1.789 64.546 2.284 2.34
(5,8,0.4) 5.927 70.854 1.884 1.988
(5,8,0.8) 6.933 91.335 1.168 1.244
Avg. n = 5 3.112 72.219 1.568 1.597667
(10,1,0.2) 0.68 51.339 1.872 1.896
(10,1,0.4) 2.388 63.414 1.5 1.524
(10,1,0.8) 3.997 95.49 1.092 1.076
(10,2,0.2) 1.385 49.292 2.272 2.296
(10,2,0.4) 3.275 90.659 1.604 1.664
(10,2,0.8) 6.495 73.787 1.132 1.148
(10,4,0.2) 1.984 61.872 2.612 2.764
(10,4,0.4) 5.734 90.983 1.92 2.112
(10,4,0.8) 7.107 86.55 1.156 1.224
(10,8,0.2) 3.509 41.995 3.08 3.2
(10,8,0.4) 6.592 82.358 2.028 2.304
(10,8,0.8) 8.916 92.576 1.172 1.304
Avg. n = 10 4.3385 73.35958333 1.786666667 1.876
(20,1,0.2) 1.067 36.45 2.18 2.216
(20,1,0.4) 2.664 82.68 1.448 1.556
(20,1,0.8) 2.884 74.534 1.1 1.092
(20,2,0.2) 2.349 40.095 2.46 2.652
(20,2,0.4) 3.452 41.717 1.696 1.856
(20,2,0.8) 5.112 83.79 1.132 1.192
(20,4,0.2) 3.786 34.659 2.84 3.184
(20,4,0.4) 8.575 73.075 1.848 2.14
(20,4,0.8) 7.749 86.321 1.152 1.284
(20,8,0.2) 5.938 68.465 3.352 3.856
(20,8,0.4) 8.88 52.627 2.088 2.616
(20,8,0.8) 10.204 94.021 1.152 1.392
Avg. n = 20 5.221666667 64.03616667 1.870666667 2.086333
(30,1,0.2) 1.762 20.877 2.068 2.228
(30,1,0.4) 3.34 83.702 1.44 1.616
(30,1,0.8) 3.773 62.764 1.056 1.108
(30,2,0.2) 3.084 43.736 2.544 2.864
(30,2,0.4) 5.554 79.378 1.64 1.968
(30,2,0.8) 5.499 86.544 1.072 1.148
(30,4,0.2) 4.721 53.873 2.984 3.464
(30,4,0.4) 8.046 74.267 1.876 2.3
(30,4,0.8) 9.045 92.51 1.14 1.304
(30,8,0.2) 7.623 46.498 3.368 4.188
(30,8,0.4) 14.266 91.851 1.916 2.684
(30,8,0.8) 11.422 75.239 1.132 1.412
Avg. n = 30 6.51125 67.60325 1.853 2.190333
Table 2: Numerical experiments comparing the revenue ordered assortment strategy (RO) and our
proposed strategy 2SLM-OPT. For each class of instances, we display the average optimality gap and
the worst-case gap, as well as the computing time and the cardinality of the offered set.
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B.2 Joint Assortment and Pricing Optimisation
This section presents some numerical results related to solve the Joint Assortment and Pricing
Problem discussed in Section 7. We analyse the performance of algorithm TLM-Opt, compared
against Fixed-Price strategy, which is optimal for the MNL and Quasi-Same Price strategy (Wang
and Sahin, 2018), which is optimal for the MNL variant considered in their paper that takes into
consideration search cost, and it basically a fixed price for all products but one, which share some
similarities with our proposed pricing policy, as it is fixed price in general but the higher and lower
ends of the utility spectrum.
Each tested family or class of instances is characterized by three numbers: the number of
products n; the threshold t, that controls how tolerant are customers with respect to differences
in attractiveness and the attractiveness of the outside option a0, which controls how likely is that
customers review all products without purchasing. In total, we experimented with 48 classes or
families of instances, each containing 250 instances. In each specific instance, revenues and utilities
are drawn from an uniform distribution between 0 and 10. We ran the three strategies: Fixed
Price, Quasi-Same Price and TLM-Opt, and report the average and worst optimality gap for Fixed
Price and Quasi-Same Price strategies, as well as cardinality of the offered set for both strategies.
These numerical experiments were conducted in Python 3.6 on a computer with 8 processors (each
with 3.6 GHz CPU) and 16 GB of RAM. Table 3 presents the results which can be summarized as
follows:
1. As expected TLM-Opt outperformed the other two algorithms in terms of revenue, and being
quite fast to execute (less than half of a second for all the instances simulated).
2. Fixed-Price policy performs the worst across the board, which is expected given that it has
the lowest degrees of freedom, as shown in example 6. Although the average gap is quite low,
it can be as high as 43.027%. In fact, fixed-price policy can be arbitrarily bad. A proof of
this fact is provided in Appendix A, Lemma 5.
3. Quasi-Same price policy also performs well on average, and the worst gap obtained was
29.964%, which is significantly better than the worst gap for Fixed Price policy.
4. The cardinality of the optimal solution is always at least the same or greater than Fixed-Price
policy. This can be observed empirically, or deduced analytically. The intuition behind it is
that given the functional form of the revenue for Fixed-Price and the fact that the Lambert
function is strictly increasing the strategy always try to show as much as possible. This, and
the fact that under same price,the dominance relation only depends upon intrinsic utilities,
imply that there is a limit on the number of products that the fixed price policy can offer §
without causing any domination for low intrinsic utility products. On the other hand, under
TLM-Opt (or Quasi Same price) we can go further and add products in such a way that the
dominance relations are not triggered, and therefore we can include more products.
§the last product ‘k’ where a1(p1)
ak(pk)
= exp(u1–uk) ≤ (1 + t)
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5. The main difference stems from the fact that our strategy leverage both ends of the utility
spectrum, and reveals the following interesting insight. Sometimes in order to avoid low
attractiveness products to be dominated, we want to: increase the price of the higher utility
products (to make them less attractive) and at the same time, reduce the price for lower
utility products, in order to make them more attractive, and making them visible for the
consumer.
(n, t, a0)
Fixed Price Quasi Same Price TLM-Opt
Avg. Gap (%) Worst Gap (%) Avg. Cardinality Avg. Gap (%) Worst Gap (%) Avg. Cardinality Avg. Cardinality
(5,0.5,1) 2.164728 17.514 1.212 0.442364 8.609 2.212 1.92
(5,0.5,10) 2.925244 27.779 1.26 0.54798 11.074 2.248 1.888
(5,0.5,100) 4.136064 43.027 1.24 1.16004 29.964 2.108 1.856
(5,1,1) 1.575348 13.446 1.384 0.253996 4.638 2.38 2.028
(5,1,10) 2.074672 24.984 1.472 0.362416 11.116 2.448 2.04
(5,1,100) 2.726188 33.938 1.416 0.52712 14.404 2.308 1.952
(5,2,1) 0.9865 8.881 1.58 0.723548 8.881 1.812 2.132
(5,2,10) 1.4685 10.592 1.536 1.040004 10.592 1.84 2.116
(5,2,100) 2.343244 32.77 1.624 1.520068 22.581 1.924 2.196
(5,5,1) 0.415064 5.103 2.012 0.153776 3.748 2.64 2.468
(5,5,10) 0.918528 17.044 1.844 0.460556 17.044 2.424 2.384
(5,5,100) 1.092544 11.539 1.972 0.466548 7.574 2.552 2.468
Avg. n = 5 1.902219 20.55142 1.546 0.638201 12.51875 2.241333 2.120667
(10,0.5,1) 3.63332 14.951 1.408 1.079656 6.774 2.408 2.896
(10,0.5,10) 4.710012 30.328 1.512 1.499744 15.575 2.512 3.132
(10,0.5,100) 6.7165 24.489 1.42 2.465028 23.517 2.364 2.912
(10,1,1) 2.69928 12.027 1.748 0.835872 7.352 2.748 3.264
(10,1,10) 3.563196 15.769 1.672 1.264116 10.296 2.672 3.18
(10,1,100) 4.822544 26.928 1.756 1.704816 15.125 2.74 3.264
(10,2,1) 1.38662 8.541 2.076 0.803492 8.541 2.576 3.236
(10,2,10) 2.37252 15.852 2.016 1.284344 15.852 2.544 3.38
(10,2,100) 3.115392 18.694 2.076 1.53734 18.694 2.612 3.34
(10,5,1) 0.611308 4.19 2.888 0.322156 2.961 3.492 3.908
(10,5,10) 0.931108 5.537 2.804 0.523108 4.975 3.432 3.84
(10,5,100) 1.323312 12.683 2.828 0.705452 12.683 3.44 3.936
Avg. n = 10 2.990426 15.83242 2.017 1.16876 11.86208 2.795 3.357333
(20,0.5,1) 5.227892 16.189 1.964 2.406408 10.383 2.964 5.412
(20,0.5,10) 6.505472 18.556 1.844 2.926688 11.734 2.844 4.868
(20,0.5,100) 9.65628 30.904 1.844 4.633812 20.602 2.84 5.104
(20,1,1) 3.917928 11.225 2.332 1.87528 7.241 3.332 5.476
(20,1,10) 4.640684 20.635 2.32 2.227456 14.112 3.32 5.384
(20,1,100) 6.765772 26.431 2.368 3.075284 17.929 3.368 5.48
(20,2,1) 2.197276 9.372 3.324 1.210484 9.372 4.112 6.164
(20,2,10) 2.669532 10.396 3.316 1.449576 9.11 4.168 6.252
(20,2,100) 3.708316 15.228 3.28 2.055808 14.009 4.092 5.924
(20,5,1) 0.878752 4.584 4.636 0.577612 4.584 5.236 6.976
(20,5,10) 1.244528 5.209 4.632 0.805216 5.209 5.26 7.1
(20,5,100) 1.718416 11.142 4.664 1.138056 7.856 5.312 7.192
Avg. n = 20 4.094237 14.98925 3.043667 2.031807 11.01175 3.904 5.944333
(30,0.5,1) 6.343964 16.145 2.24 3.642808 10.606 3.24 7.344
(30,0.5,10) 8.202948 22.238 2.224 4.572832 15.339 3.224 7.32
(30,0.5,100) 10.6693 26.659 2.228 6.018692 18.973 3.224 7.2
(30,1,1) 4.0957 14.803 3.044 2.266944 10.581 4.044 7.464
(30,1,10) 5.039272 19.686 3.24 2.906664 13.583 4.24 7.892
(30,1,100) 7.451636 23.606 3.084 4.349844 14.428 4.084 7.884
(30,2,1) 2.193896 12.267 4.344 1.32162 9.526 5.252 8.588
(30,2,10) 3.110752 13.315 4.252 1.911924 9.177 5.148 8.64
(30,2,100) 4.005252 19.963 4.476 2.473688 19.963 5.4 8.684
(30,5,1) 1.023416 4.25 6.26 0.74478 4.25 6.88 10.132
(30,5,10) 1.328936 5.534 6.328 0.93428 4.053 7.012 10.232
(30,5,100) 1.730272 6.284 6.436 1.189296 6.164 7.136 10.104
Avg. n = 30 4.599612 15.39583 4.013 2.694448 11.38692 4.907 8.457
Table 3: Numerical experiments comparing Fixed-Price and Quasi-Same price against TLM-Opt.
For each class of instances, for non-optimal strategies we display the average optimality gap, worst-
case gap and the cardinality of the offered set. We also provide the average of those metrics for
each value of n considered.
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